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THE PROBLEM OF RESOURCE ACCESS
Lee Anne Fennell
The Coasean insight that transaction costs stand between the world as we know it and an
ideal of perfect efficiency has provided generations of law and economics scholars with an
analytic North Star. But for legal scholars interested in the efficiency implications of
property arrangements, transaction costs turn out to constitute an unhelpful category.
Transaction costs are related to property rights in unstable and contested ways, and they
comprise a heterogeneous set of impediments, not all of which are amenable to cost-effective
reduction through law. Treating them as focal confuses the cause of our difficulties in
structuring access to resources (positive transaction costs) with the solution to the problem
presented by a world featuring scarce resources and positive transaction costs. A broader
notion of resource access costs, appropriately subdivided, can correct problems of
overinclusion, underinclusion, and insufficient specification in the transaction cost concept.
The resulting analytic clarity will allow property theorists to contribute more usefully to
solving resource problems.

INTRODUCTION
n The Problem of Social Cost, Ronald Coase firmly installed transaction
costs at the center of the economic analysis of law.1 The potential for
these costs to inconveniently interpose themselves between the world as
we know it and an ideal of perfect efficiency has provided generations of
law and economics scholars with an analytic North Star. But the relationship between property rights and transaction costs is a fundamentally unstable one. Property rights seem to be an antecedent to transactions,2 yet

I

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
 Max Pam Professor of Law and Herbert and Marjorie Fried Research Scholar, University of Chicago Law School. Prior drafts of this Article circulated under the title “Resource Access Costs.” For
helpful comments, I thank Abraham Bell, Yun-chien Chang, Daniel Cole, Hanoch Dagan, David Dana,
Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Nestor Davidson, Harold Demsetz, Peter DiCola, Daniel Kelly, Ronit LevineSchnur, Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, Richard McAdams, Jonathan Nash, Ariel Porat, Carol Rose, Christopher Serkin, Joseph Singer, Henry Smith, Lior Strahilevitz, Stewart Sterk, Avishalom Tor, Eyal Zamir,
anonymous reviewers for the American Law and Economics Association, and participants in the 2012
Property Works in Progress Conference at Fordham Law School, Hebrew University’s Private and
Commercial Law Workshop, Northwestern University’s Law and Economics Colloquium, and faculty
workshops at Notre Dame School of Law and the University of Chicago Law School. I also thank the
Stuart C. and JoAnn Nathan Faculty Fund for financial support.
1 R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). The Coase Theorem holds
that when transaction costs are zero, an efficient result will be reached, regardless of the initial assignment of legal entitlements. See id. at 8.
2 See, e.g., id. at 8 (“It is necessary to know whether the damaging business is liable or not for
damage caused since without the establishment of this initial delimitation of rights there can be no market transactions to transfer and recombine them.”); Douglas W. Allen, Transaction Costs, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 893, 898 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000)
(“Given that trade is the transfer of property rights, there can be no trade (and hence no gains from
trade) in the absence of property rights.”).
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property can also be viewed as an invention necessitated by transaction
costs,3 or as an input into the magnitude and composition of transaction
costs.4 To think about property and transaction costs together, then, is to
confront a conceptual Möbius strip.5 Isolating and addressing transaction
costs turns out to be a slippery business that can interfere with the goal of
structuring resource access optimally.6 For property theorists, it is the
wrong enterprise.
Transaction costs are not always, and not uniquely, problematic. Like
other ways of structuring access to resources, transactions are costly to
produce.7 Because making transactions cheaper or less necessary consumes resources that might be better deployed elsewhere, we cannot infer
inefficiency from high transaction costs alone.8 Nor are costly transactions
the only source of inefficiency worth addressing; the costs of keeping resources in place (through property rights or otherwise) must also be considered. The important question is whether legal changes can costeffectively improve resource access. That inquiry proves to be broader in
some ways, narrower in other ways, and more finely specified than the
usual focus on transaction costs allows.9
This Article argues that transaction costs do not comprise a useful category for legal scholars interested in the efficiency implications of property
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
3 See Yun-chien Chang & Henry E. Smith, An Economic Analysis of Civil Versus Common Law
Property, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 31 n.92 (2012) (“[I]n a zero transaction cost world, we would
not need property rights at all.”); Brian Angelo Lee & Henry E. Smith, The Nature of
Coasean Property, 59 INT’L REV. ECON. 145, 148 (2012) (“The institution of property is itself a mechanism that enables us to avoid these [transaction] costs.”); see also infra notes 88–90 and accompanying text.
4 See, e.g., Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Endogenous Transaction Costs 8 (Jan. 2012) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
5 Some definitions of transaction costs explicitly embrace this entwinement with property rights.
See Allen, supra note 2, at 897 (discussing property rights and transaction costs as “fundamentally interlinked” and “two sides of the same coin” on the “property right” vision of transaction costs).
6 The ultimate aim is optimal resource use, but I focus here on the law’s role in structuring access
as a proxy for use. Some complications will be discussed below. See infra section IV.D, TAN 187–191.
7 See HAROLD DEMSETZ, FROM ECONOMIC MAN TO ECONOMIC SYSTEM 109–10 (2008). Legal changes may be able to reduce the cost of inputs into that production process, but should be pursued
only when the cost reductions are worth the price. See infra section II.B, TAN 119–144.
8 Coase himself emphasized that external effects do not necessarily signal an inefficiency warranting intervention. See Coase, supra note 1, at 18. Harold Demsetz would extend Coase’s point to apply
regardless of the presence and magnitude of transaction costs, on the ground that too-costly transactions
are efficiently left undone. See Harold Demsetz, The Problem of Social Cost: What Problem? A Critique of the Reasoning of A.C. Pigou and R.H. Coase, 7 REV. L. & ECON. 1, 10 (2011). Pierre Schlag
has argued that several points Coase made about externalities could be made in an identically structured
manner about transaction costs. See Pierre Schlag, The Problem of Transaction Costs, 62 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1661, 1665 (1989). Although my points and Demsetz’s are different from Schlag’s, they find
common ground in this observation.
9 Although the problem with the transaction cost category is entangled with definitional disputes, it
is not ultimately terminological in nature. See infra section I.B, TAN 41–84.
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arrangements.10 Treating them as focal confuses the cause of our difficulties in structuring access to resources (positive transaction costs) with the
solution to the problem that a world featuring scarce resources and positive
transaction costs presents. To see the point, observe what the counterfactual zero transaction cost world does for us. Certainly, it ensures that the
“things” that property scholars focus their attention on — entitlements to
emit, pieces of land, water rights, and so on — reach their highest-valuing
users. But the zero transaction cost assumption also, and crucially, means
that we need not worry about spending too many or too few resources on
the transactions that accomplish these feats; all transactions are free.
Likewise, we need not worry in the zero transaction cost world about
keeping things in place when their current possessor is the highest valuer;
the necessary transactions to prevent transfers will also be costless.
As soon as we introduce positive transaction costs into a world of resource scarcity, we must worry not only about thing-misallocation but also
about resources being misallocated to structure access to those things. To
focus single-mindedly on reducing or overcoming transaction costs is to
miss the significance of the other resource access structures that their presence has necessitated, and the costs associated with those structures. For
example, the appealing idea that we might reduce transaction costs through
thoughtful entitlement design must be tempered with attention to the converse possibility: that we might pay too much, in the currency of entitlement design, to achieve transaction cost reductions.11
There are three basic reasons that transaction costs comprise a poor
category around which to organize legal interventions12 or against which to
judge the efficacy of different entitlement design choices. First, the category (at least as typically invoked) is underinclusive in ways that go to the
heart of the connection between property rights and transactions. The second problem is overinclusiveness. Not all of the costs that are thrown to–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
10 I am not the first to question the significance of transaction costs. See, e.g., Harold Demsetz,
Ownership and the Externality Problem, in PROPERTY RIGHTS: COOPERATION, CONFLICT, AND
LAW 282, 284 (Terry L. Anderson & Fred S. McChesny eds., 2003) (“The approach I present here argues against the emphasis given by Coase, and now by the profession, to transaction cost.”); Schlag,
supra note 8, at 1699 (“To treat the presence, absence, and identity of transaction costs as the predicate
determination for deciding whether to create or supplant actual pricing markets is wrongheaded.”).
11 For instance, the cost of making riparian water rights more transaction-friendly could swamp the
gains from the newly enabled trades. I thank David Dana for this example.
12 I use the term “interventions” in this Article to designate new, targeted efforts to improve resource access outside of ordinary market processes. My use of the term is not meant to suggest that
there exists an alternative arrangement in which government intervention is wholly absent. Clearly, the
government is always involved in matters of resource access, even if only to provide institutional support for the operation of markets or to enforce (or adjudicate) property rights. See A.W. Brian Simpson,
Coase v. Pigou Reexamined, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 53, 61 (1996) (“When [Coase] instances ‘inaction’ as
one possible reaction to the problem of social cost what he must really mean is leaving the matter to the
common law. Since courts cannot simply wash their hands of disputes, this never means doing nothing.”).
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gether in the transaction cost bucket are equally amenable to legal interventions, nor do all of them signal inefficiencies in the allocation of resources. The third problem relates to insufficient specification of impediments to optimal resource allocation. In some cases, both nonowners and
owners agree that a transfer (or nontransfer) should take place and need
only coordinate over carrying it out at the going rate,13 while in other cases they are in conflict over whether the resource should be transferred, or
how the surplus from a transfer should be split up.14 These are different
sorts of problems that call for different solutions.
In some ways, these are familiar points. It is already understood that
all ways of structuring access to resources are costly.15 Transaction costs
can be (and have been) defined to include the costs of property rights16 —
although this is more of a conceptual stretch than proponents of the approach have acknowledged.17 There are large literatures that address vari–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
13 The “going rate” for a nontransfer is zero, while the “going rate” in competitive markets is the
(no-haggle) competitively determined market price.
In settings where there is no “going
rate” — that is, where the parties must decide on their own how to divide surplus — conflict over surplus division may be a significant impediment.
14 Some scholars have flagged this heterogeneity in transaction costs. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Eric
Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE
L.J. 1027, 1036 (1995) (“[A]n overarching ‘Coasean’ theme of our analysis is that the type of transaction cost matters: It is inadequate to think of ‘transaction costs’ as some sort of composite good whose
components imply similar policies.”); Carol M. Rose, The Shadow of The Cathedral, 106 YALE L.J.
2175, 2184 (1997) (distinguishing “Type I Transaction Costs,” which she defines as “difficulties that
may result from having to find and assemble numerous or indistinctly defined interested parties, the
costs that come prior to bargaining altogether,” from “Type II Transaction Costs,” which are “the impediments that come after bargaining begins, from parties who are close-mouthed, poker-faced, strategically bargaining misanthropes”); Richard N. Langlois, The Secret Life of Mundane Transaction Costs,
27 ORG. STUD. 1389, 1389–90 (2006) (distinguishing transaction costs associated with “opportunism”
and “incentive misalignment” from standard neoclassical “frictions” that are analogous to transportation costs). Other scholars have moved certain conflict costs — notably the costs of strategic behavior
— outside of the transaction cost framework altogether. See infra section I.B.1, TAN 48–66. What the
analysis here adds to these earlier taxonomic moves is not just a matter of framing and emphasis; I also
locate the conflict-versus-coordination distinction in a broader set of resource access impediments that
encompasses the costs involved in keeping resources in place as well as the costs of transacting over
them.
15 See, e.g., THRÁINN EGGERTSSON, ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR AND INSTITUTIONS 102 (1990)
(“The firm, the market, and the legal system are all costly social arrangements.”); Allen, supra note 2,
at 895 (“[A]ll methods of allocating resources have costs and benefits and no single mechanism works
for free and dominates all others . . . .”).
16 See, e.g., Allen, supra note 2, at 898–99 (observing that commonly used understandings of transaction costs “implicitly recognize the threat of appropriation or theft” and stating that “[w]hen property
rights are protected and maintained in any context, transaction costs exist”). Yet Allen’s complaints
about the “redundant” use of phrases like “zero transaction costs and complete property rights,” id. at
899 (internal quotation mark omitted), suggest this definition has not won universal acceptance.
17 A thought experiment shows how aggressive this reading of transaction costs really is. Suppose
we were to reframe the Coase Theorem around an assumption of zero transfer resistance costs, rather
than zero transaction costs, in a world without any private property rights at all. If those who value a
resource most highly can costlessly hold onto it, but others cannot, efficient outcomes would eventually
follow if we make assumptions about background transfer mechanisms that are as strong as the assumptions that Coase implicitly made about background property rights. Had costless transfer resistance
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ous aspects of the cost-minimization problem associated with structuring
resource access, including work on the theory of the firm and problems of
incomplete contracting.18 In the property field, work on the optimal scope
and form of land ownership has taken to heart lessons from the theory of
the firm in balancing internal management and external transactions.19
The relationship between the specification of property rights and the costs
of transacting has received attention as well, with literatures developing
around divided and incomplete property rights.20 Scholars have also recognized important differences among types of transaction costs.21
Yet these insights, threaded through different economic and legal
literatures, have not been brought together in a way that allows for their
intuitive use in legal contexts. Legal scholars regularly invoke the Coase
Theorem’s central term in law reviews,22 workshops, and classrooms, but
they usually do so without specifying what they mean by it, much less
what assumptions they are making about the surrounding property regime.23 This reflexive resort to transaction costs keeps legal scholars, and
especially property scholars, from building as usefully as they might on
existing insights. Property theory today is alive with debate on core questions of entitlement design: whether property rules or liability rules should
dominate, whether an exclusion- or thing-based vision of property should
trump the bundle-of-rights metaphor, whether fixed tenure menus aid or
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
been Coase’s frame, we might now be debating whether the costs of markets or other means of moving
resources in a more or less costly fashion were “really” transfer resistance costs, just as we now debate
whether the institutions that provide transfer resistance (property rights) “really” represent transaction
costs.
18 See generally, e.g., R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA (n.s.) 386 (1937); Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and
Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691 (1986); Oliver Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the
Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1119 (1990). New Institutional Economics uses a broad understanding of transaction costs to examine questions of institutional design within firms and other organizational structures. See generally, e.g., OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES
(1975).
19 See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS &
PROC.) 347, 354–59 (1967), Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315 (1993).
20 See, e.g., Ayres & Talley, supra note 14; Antonio Nicita et al., Towards a Theory of Incomplete
Property Rights (May 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com
/abstract=1067466; see also Amnon Lehavi, The Dynamic Law of Property: Theorizing the Role of Legal Standards, 42 RUTGERS L.J. 81 (2010); Antonio Nicita & Matteo Rizzolli, Hold-Up and Externality: The Firm as a Nexus of Incomplete Rights, 59 INT’L REV. ECON. 157 (2012).
21 See supra note 14.
22 According to LexisNexis, in 2012 alone at least 965 law review articles included the term “transaction cost” or “transaction costs” (in March 2013, the search “transaction costs and date geq
(01/01/2012) and date leq (12/31/2012)” in the U.S. & Canadian Law Review database produced 965
hits).
23 There have, however, been some careful attempts to locate a fixed starting point in comparing the
effects of different institutional arrangements. See Ellickson, supra note 19, at 1326 n.34 (building on
earlier work by Frank Michelman and setting out “three foundational entitlements” that are treated as
exogenous in comparing land institutions).
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impede efficiency, and so on. These conversations inevitably circle around
to transaction costs, but because the term is confusingly and indeterminately bound up in the very enterprise at hand — designing entitlements — it
can offer little guidance.
In place of a single term — transaction costs — which carries a meaning that is opaque, contested, and unstably related to the design of entitlements, we need a set of concepts that will clarify the legal scholar’s task of
improving access to resources. As a first step in that direction, I propose
the umbrella term of “resource access costs” to designate the full range of
costs associated with structuring access to resources. Significantly, both
the costs of completing resource transfers24 and the costs of resisting them
must be taken into account, along with the costs of thing-misallocations
that occur when either set of costs becomes prohibitively large.
Creating this wide class of costs is only an interim step toward addressing concrete resource problems, however. Indeed, one function of the exercise is to emphasize the potentially unbounded nature of resource access
costs, and to shift attention to the constructive task of identifying areas
where law can cost-effectively improve resource access. Accordingly, I
draw distinctions that address the problems of overinclusion and insufficient specification flagged above. I focus on two important subsets —
conflict costs and coordination costs — each of which presents distinct difficulties, corresponds to different features of an entitlement regime, and responds to different interventions. I also make a cross-cutting distinction
between resource access costs that represent unsolved collective action
problems (such as the obstacles neighbors face in trying to buy out a factory’s entitlement to pollute) and those that do not (such as the cost of paper
and ink, or the time it takes a human being to read a page of text).
This approach has two main payoffs. First, recognizing the full range
of resource access costs challenges conventional thinking surrounding
transaction costs. Efforts to reduce or avoid transaction costs will often be
misguided. Indeed, transaction costs may at times be inefficiently low,
producing too many transfers of resources to higher-valuing users.25 Reframing the relevant set of costs thus clarifies the basis for, and limits on,
legal intervention.
A second set of payoffs sounds in property theory. Property rights are
powerful mechanisms for paving the way or blocking the path between re–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
24 I focus in this Article on “transfers” rather than “transactions” to make clear that nonmarket
transfers are included.
25 My argument here is very different from the argument about “too low” transaction costs put forward in David M. Driesen & Shubha Ghosh, The Functions of Transaction Costs: Rethinking Transaction Cost Minimization in a World of Friction, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 61, 99 (2005). The authors refer to
instances where transaction costs are prohibitive, and hence not incurred. In my analysis, these unincurred costs are still transaction costs. See infra section I.C, TAN 85–91 (discussing latent and realized
transaction costs).

FENNELL - CLEAN BOOKPROOFS CORRECTED

8

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

03/08/13 – 12:57 PM

[Vol. 126:1

sources and high-valuing users. Meaningful evaluation of these arrangements requires moving past the property scholar’s tendency to focus on the
primary “thing” in view when evaluating efficiency. That focus draws attention to impediments to the thing’s efficient allocation but away from the
efficient allocation of resources that might be used (or not) to carry out
transfers, stop them, or to make them less expensive. Likewise, property
scholars concerned with transaction costs often talk past each other; some
focus their attention on features in entitlement design that ease coordination, while others focus on dampening the conflict costs associated with
private information.26 A clarifying vocabulary can improve the quality of
this dialogue and recenter attention on the necessary design tradeoffs.
The analysis proceeds in four parts. Part I discusses shortfalls in the
transaction cost concept. Part II constructs the category of resource access
costs and shows how it reframes transaction cost problems. Part III shows
how the resource access cost category can be refined and subdivided to inform legal interventions directed at resource access improvements. Part IV
considers some objections and extensions.
I. TRANSACTION COST TROUBLE
The Coase Theorem, as it is taught in law school classrooms, stands for
the idea that parties will bargain to an efficient result regardless of the
law’s initial assignment of entitlements if transaction costs are zero.27
Students are then reminded that, as Coase well recognized, transaction
costs are not zero, and indeed are routinely large. Hence, the initial assignment of legal entitlements can and does matter for efficiency. This
formulation is fairly uncontroversial as far as it goes, and the takeaway
lesson that law matters after all should be reassuring to law students and
their professors. Nonetheless, the Coase Theorem often has the side effect
of turning transaction costs into objects of resentment.28 If only they were
zero! Why must they be so large? Isn’t there anything anyone can do
about them, these destroyers of efficiency?
This negative attention on transaction costs has led to some fruitful advances, but also to some wrong turns and dead ends. Understanding what
the law should or should not do about transaction costs has been compli–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
26 Carol Rose makes this point when she observes that Ian Ayres and Eric Talley appear to have
concerned themselves with “Type II” rather than “Type I” transaction costs. Rose, supra note 14, at
2184.
27 For example, the University of Chicago Law School included this summary of the Coase Theorem in the planner it distributed to law students at the beginning of last school year: “Simply stated: in
a world where there are no transaction costs, an efficient outcome will occur regardless of the initial
allocation of rights.” UNIV. OF CHI. LAW SCH., THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW SCHOOL 2011–
12 SOURCEBOOK AND PLANNER 21.
28 See, e.g., Carl J. Dahlman, The Problem of Externality, 22 J.L. & ECON. 141, 142 (1979) (“[I]n
the theory of externalities, transaction costs are the root of all evil.”).
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cated by the absence of any agreed-upon definition of the term or any systematic way of ordering the heterogeneous phenomena that answer to that
name. Behind a raft of terminological debates and taxonomic shortfalls
lies a deep and often unacknowledged confusion about how transaction
costs relate to property rights. As a result, a focus on transaction costs —
however defined — misdirects property scholars. The category does not
align well with justifications for legal intervention.
There are three problems with using the transaction cost category as a
guide to identifying inefficiencies that might call for changes in law or policy: underinclusiveness, overinclusiveness, and insufficiently specified
subcategories. Although these problems are entangled with definitional
debates, they cannot be resolved through semantics alone. Section A examines a problem of overinclusiveness suggested by Harold Demsetz’s critique of Coase’s emphasis on transaction costs. Section B turns to a set of
definitional debates about the breadth and content of the transaction cost
category. Resolving these debates in favor of widening the transaction
cost tent can mitigate underinclusiveness, but only by exacerbating the
problem of insufficiently specified subcategories. Section C pushes harder
on the problems of underinclusiveness and overinclusiveness by focusing
on unexpended transaction costs that manifest themselves latently in societal structures and resource misallocations.
A. The Demsetzian Critique
Over the past decade, Demsetz has produced a significant body of law
and economics scholarship that, among its other contributions, challenges
certain aspects of Coase’s analysis and conclusions in The Problem of Social Cost. One element of that critique goes to the relationship between
transaction costs and economic inefficiency. While agreeing with Coase
that a zero transaction cost world would produce allocative efficiency,
Demsetz views it as deeply mistaken to equate positive transaction costs,
or rational reactions to them, with inefficiency. In a representative passage, Demsetz analogizes transaction costs to transportation costs:
Imagine a railroad capable of shipping goods between two firms. The railroad
incurs cost if it does this, and the cost may be so high that the shipment does
not occur (and, instead, as Coase wrote in ‘The Nature of the Firm’ (1937), the
would-be receiving firm chooses to rely on in-house production of the good
that would have been shipped were there no transport cost). No inefficiency
has been created if the shipment does not take place under these circumstances, for the implied gain from making the shipment is less than the cost of doing so. But, pray tell, we reach the same conclusion if we change ‘shipment
cost’ to transaction cost. So, we had better re-examine Coase’s reasoning
about positive transaction cost.29

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
29

Demsetz, supra note 8, at 7.
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At one level, this illustration makes the simple but powerful point that
everything costs something, and the cost of transacting over resources is
no different in kind from the cost of running machinery or of moving
things from place to place.30 We expect rational actors to make decisions
based on what things cost, given existing technologies and physical constraints. It is a mistake to call the results inefficient if they cannot be otherwise, or cannot be otherwise at a cost that is less than the identified
suboptimalities themselves.
So far so good. But digging deeper into the example raises the question of why the goods that one firm needs are located a train’s journey
away from that firm. The legal analogue, of course, is the assignment of
rights to parties that are not the highest-valuing users of those rights. The
movement of rights, like the movement of goods, only comes into play
when a starting point has separated these elements from the place where
they would do the most good. Because getting them to that place costs
more than it is worth, Demsetz is right to say that, given our starting point,
the results are efficient. But we need not take the starting point as a given.
Demsetz recognizes this when he notes (citing Coase) that the goods might
be manufactured on site rather than moved over from elsewhere.31
Not only can private parties use a change in ownership structure to alter the starting point, but the law itself can decide how entitlements will be
allocated in the first instance. Demsetz recognizes this as well. Indeed, he
locates the inefficiency in Coase’s account in the law’s misallocation of legal entitlements, not in positive transaction costs.32 To legal scholars,
Demsetz’s insistence that the law, not the market, is to blame for inefficiencies will sound neither novel nor surprising. We are already occupationally inclined to think law is the most likely culprit, or at least the most
tractable margin for seeking improvement. Instead, legal scholars’ interest
in transaction costs is very much like what our interest in transportation
costs might be if the government were to propose allocating location–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
30

Elsewhere Demsetz describes transactions as products like any other:
Transaction cost is no different from other costs in regard to determining which good or service is to be produced. If the cost of producing a hydrogen-fueled automobile exceeds the
price that people are willing to pay for the vehicle, efficient resource allocation requires that
this vehicle not be produced. Similarly, efficient resource allocation requires that a transaction not take place if the cost of producing the transaction exceeds the price that people are
willing to pay to engage in exchange. We do not shout “inefficiency!” if the vehicle is not
produced. Why proclaim inefficiency if a transaction is not produced?
DEMSETZ, supra note 7, at 109–10.
31 Demsetz, supra note 8, at 7.
32 E.g., DEMSETZ, supra note 7, at 111–12. Demsetz focuses on Coase’s statement that when
transaction costs are higher than the gains from transacting, “the initial delimitation of legal rights does
have an effect on the efficiency with which the economic system operates.” Id. (quoting Coase, supra
note 1, at 16) (internal quotation marks omitted). As Demsetz convincingly argues, the economic system does not operate with any less efficiency owing to positive transaction costs; instead, it “does the
best that can possibly be done” under the circumstances. Id. at 112.
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specific goods by random helicopter drop. Positive transportation costs
would make this a poor way of getting goods physically into the hands of
those who value them most highly. But if transportation costs were zero
(the goods could frictionlessly glide to the places they are most valued),
we would not fret about the distribution mechanism.
On this account, transaction costs help to identify instances in which
the law’s allocation mechanism is likely to be worth the cost of worrying
about. Transaction costs are thus different in kind from other sorts of
costs, like burning cleaner coal or moving goods around from place to
place.33 And they are different in kind for a reason Demsetz himself emphasizes: they are occasioned by an act occurring outside of the market
system in the court’s assignment of entitlements.34 Legal scholars may,
therefore, have good reason to pay special attention to transaction costs,
even if economists have no reason to treat them differently from any other
cost. High transaction costs might suggest that courts and other legal institutions should try harder to assign entitlements efficiently in the first place,
or that legal scholars might work on finding other ways to lower, counter,
or sidestep transaction costs.
Yet each of these measures should be undertaken only if it is worth it,
which requires a comparison of all the possible ways of dealing with the
misallocation, from letting it be, to resolving it with a more accurate initial
assignment, to altering the underlying entitlement design, to applying some
other transaction cost reduction or avoidance technique. Guido Calabresi
makes just this point in observing that the costs of both transactions and
transaction substitutes must be considered in deciding what to do about
misallocations.35 Demsetz does not make such comparisons because he
takes the legal system (and the entitlements and entitlement assignments it
produces) as given.36 Once the legal system itself is considered up for
grabs, as it is for law and economics scholars, we must ask additional
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
33 These are two of the examples that Demsetz uses in arguing that transaction costs are no different
from other costs. See Demsetz, supra note 8, at 7, 10.
34 See, e.g., id. at 8–9.
35 See Guido Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability Rules — A Comment,
11 J.L. & ECON. 67, 69 (1968) (observing that “transactions do cost money,” and that “substitutes for
transactions, be they taxation, liability rules, or structural rules, are also not costless”). Calabresi goes
on to explain: “Whatever device is used, the question must be asked: Are its costs worth the benefits in
better resource allocations it brings about or have we instead approached a false optimum by a series of
games which are not worth the candles used?” Id. This general approach is consistent with Calabresi’s
later work on the costs of accidents, which also powerfully applies the insight that problems are only
worth solving if the solution is cheaper than the problem itself. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI,
THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970).
36 See Lee & Smith, supra note 3, at 150 (“Key to Demsetz’s argument is that law, the legal system,
and their effects on initial entitlements are treated as given, as they are to mainstream economists.”).
Demsetz does, however, consider (without endorsing) the possibility that the court system could be run
on market principles. If courts were dependent “on revenues secured from petitioners who purchase
their services and decisions,” he argues, “ownership of a disputed resource would never go to the petitioner who is less capable of maximizing value from its use.” Demsetz, supra note 8, at 9.
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questions to determine whether high transaction costs indicate inefficiency.
Consider first the initial separation of the resource and the actor. After taking into account the incentive effects of different allocation methods and
other normative constraints that may cabin allocation choices, there may
be no cost-effective way to get the resource into the hands of the actor in
the first instance. Where these conditions obtain, we might well be skeptical about whether there is any efficiency problem in the picture at all, despite the presence of prohibitively high transaction costs.
What about the prospect of lowering the transaction costs themselves?
If we could invent a faster train, so to speak, costs that were initially prohibitive could fall low enough to be worth incurring. We cannot assume
that the absence of a faster train is a product of inefficiency, however,
without knowing why the faster train is not running. Does it cost more to
invent, produce, and maintain than it is worth? Have political factions
conspired to keep it out of production, or does the law fail to grant sufficient returns to the inventor?37 In other words, the standard Chicago assertion that there is no cost-effective faster train (because if there were, we
would all be riding on it already) depends on assumptions about the processes (markets and politics) that produce trains. Likewise, if the magnitude of transaction costs depends not on the interplay of competitive markets but rather on governmental responses (or the lack thereof) to
collective action problems, the Chicago retort would hold considerably less
sway. But is that the case? The answer depends on just what we mean by
transaction costs.
Demsetz defines transaction costs in a manner that is much narrower
than most property rights theorists use the term.38 This definitional move
frames both his criticism of the central place given to transaction costs in
Coasean analysis39 and his suggestion that “ownership costs” should receive more attention.40 Definitions aside, his critique flags an important
problem of overinclusiveness insofar as he observes that transaction costs
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
37 Even if we get an affirmative answer to one of these questions, it is still not clear we can claim
inefficiency. We would need to compare the costs of altering the legal or political landscape in ways
that would be more conducive to the production of the fast trains with the gains those changes will deliver.
38 See Allen, supra note 2, at 903–04; Lee & Smith, supra note 3, at 150.
39 DEMSETZ, supra note 7, at 106–17. See generally Demsetz, supra note 8; Demsetz, supra note
10.
40 See, e.g., DEMSETZ, supra note 7, at 116 (classifying free-rider problems as “ownership costs”
rather than “transaction costs”); see also Demsetz, supra note 8, at 5 (discussing the “positive cost of
ownership” in connection with the existence and enforceability of private property rights); Demsetz,
supra note 10, at 284 (describing his approach as one that not only “argues against the emphasis given
by Coase, and now by the profession, to transaction cost” but “also argues that more emphasis should
be given to the conditions of ownership”); Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights II: The
Competition Between Private and Collective Ownership, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S653, S655–56 (2002)
(observing that Coase assumed the existence of private property rights, whereas Demsetz’s own work
examined the development of those rights).
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may not signal inefficiencies. This problem of overinclusiveness is not
addressed (although it is obscured) by expanding the transaction cost category to encompass elements that map better onto the case for legal intervention. A broader definition can indeed bring Demsetz’s “ownership
costs” (and much else) within the transaction cost tent, but as long as it
leaves murky how these elements relate to each other and to legal interventions, the confusion and incompleteness in the analysis of resource allocation will persist.
B. Contested Definitional Terrain
The definition of transaction costs has been a source of disagreement
and confusion among scholars.41 In The Problem of Social Cost, Coase
himself did not use the term “transaction cost”42 but instead referred to the
“costs involved in carrying out market transactions,” which he described as
follows:
In order to carry out a market transaction it is necessary to discover who it is
that one wishes to deal with, to inform people that one wishes to deal and on
what terms, to conduct negotiations leading up to a bargain, to draw up the
contract, to undertake the inspection needed to make sure that the terms of the
contract are being observed, and so on.43

Later, Coase embraced Carl Dahlman’s breakdown of transaction costs into
“search and information costs, bargaining and decision costs, [and] policing and enforcement costs.”44 Scholars have subsequently developed a variety of other transaction cost taxonomies.45
There is broad agreement that the costs people incur to get together,
communicate with each other, and draw up and police contracts represent
transaction costs. But the status of some other elements is contested. Indeed, Douglas Allen has observed a sharp dichotomy in the use of the
term, with the “neoclassical” literature taking a much narrower view of

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
41 See Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 16 (1982) (“The meaning of transaction costs is not well-standardized in the literature.”).
42 See Robert C. Ellickson, The Case for Coase and Against “Coaseanism,” 99 YALE L.J. 611, 612
n.8 (1989) (making this observation).
43 Coase, supra note 1, at 15.
44 R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 6 (1988) (quoting Dahlman, supra note
28, at 148) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Ellickson, supra note 42, at 614–15 (characterizing this taxonomy as dividing up transaction costs temporally, based on whether they are sustained
before, during, or after the bargaining process).
45 See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 42, at 615–16 (breaking up transaction costs along functional
lines into “get-together costs,” “decision and execution costs,” and “information costs”); Langlois, supra note 14, at 1392 fig.1 (breaking down transaction costs in several ways, including whether the costs
are “fixed,” “a function of time,” or “a function of number of exchanges or volume of trade”); Rose,
supra note 14, at 2184 (defining and distinguishing “Type I” and “Type II” transaction costs).
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transaction costs than the “property rights” literature.46 On the narrowest
account (the one to which Demsetz subscribes), transaction costs are limited to the cost of using the price system under conditions of perfect competition47 — a state of the world that leaves no room for haggling and that
presupposes the existence of property rights. Other accounts, including
those used by most scholars concerned with property rights, are considerably broader.
Three factors relevant to the law’s treatment of entitlements have been
variously welcomed in, booted out, or ignored altogether in various definitions of transaction costs: the costs of strategic bargaining behavior, the
costs of defining and enforcing property rights, and the costs of internal
governance within property holdings or firms. Although including these
contested costs helps to address problems of underinclusiveness in the
transaction cost category, it increases the need for useful subcategories by
introducing greater heterogeneity among costs.
1. Strategic Bargaining Behavior. — Some of the most significant and
troublesome barriers to exchange involve strategic behavior. Two familiar
subspecies of strategic behavior are “free riding,” which involves understating the price one is willing to pay, and “holding out,” which involves
overstating the price one is willing to accept.48 In addition to these problems, which are usually associated with multi-player scenarios,49 there are
problems of bilateral monopoly in which struggles over the division of
surplus can take the form of a Chicken Game.50 These strategic impedi–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
46 See Allen, supra note 2, at 893–904. The neoclassical view is exemplified by Demsetz, who
treats transaction costs as nothing more or less than the costs of using the market. See id. at 903–04;
see also Schlag, supra note 8, at 1674–76 (discussing definitional disputes).
47 See DEMSETZ, supra note 7, at 107.
48 Individuals who accurately represent their idiosyncratically high reservation prices are sometimes
dubbed “holdouts,” but I prefer Gideon Parchomovsky and Peter Siegleman’s alternative term
“holdins.” Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Selling Mayberry: Communities and Individuals
in Law and Economics, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 75, 128–29 (2004). An extreme version of (true) holding
out involves misrepresenting not only the magnitude of one’s reservation price but also its sign — as
where a terrible musician, whose sounds hurt even his own ears, will play in order to be paid to stop.
See, e.g., Daniel B. Kelly, Strategic Spillovers, 111 COLUM. L REV. 1641 (2011); see also Harold Demsetz, Theoretical Efficiency in Pollution Control: Comment on Comments, 9 W. ECON. J. 444 (1971);
Harold Demsetz, When Does the Rule of Liability Matter?, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 13, 22–25 (1972).
49 Free riding arises in contexts where more than one person is in a position to fund a good from
which other individuals cannot be cost-effectively excluded. Holding out is often, although not always,
associated with settings where a number of parties hold entitlements that must be assembled, each of
which is essential to the project as a whole. For an illuminating discussion of the differences and similarities between holding out and free riding, see Lloyd Cohen, Holdouts and Free Riders, 20 J. LEGAL
STUD. 351 (1991).
50 The Chicken Game, so named for its structural resemblance to drivers playing “chicken” on a
roadway, has been used to illuminate a variety of bargaining situations. See, e.g., DOUGLAS G. BAIRD
ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 43–45 (1994); WARD FARNSWORTH, THE LEGAL ANALYST
130–32 (2007). Because large-number holdout situations can be broken down into a series of twoplayer bilateral monopoly situations between a would-be assembler and each would-be seller, the same
Chicken Game analysis that applies to the latter also applies to the former. See, e.g., CHARLES J.
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ments to bargaining are included in some definitions of the term “transaction costs,” but not others.51 Coase’s own phrase, “to conduct negotiations
leading up to a bargain,”52 could be read to encompass strategic interactions. Indeed, it might seem implausible that Coase would mention the
costs of “negotiation” — an activity that, by definition, only occurs when
there is surplus on the table that must be divided up53 — unless he meant
to include the costs associated with parties attempting to garner larger
shares of that surplus for themselves.54 However, Coase later expressed
doubt that conflicts over surplus division would thwart bargains in a significant proportion of cases,55 which might support a narrower reading.56
Demsetz, for his part, contends that strategic behavior — manifested as
misrepresentation of reservation prices — cannot count as a transaction
cost.57 Similarly, Robert Cooter asserts that parties to bargaining interactions face “another obstacle of an entirely different kind” from transaction
costs when they must decide how to divide up the surplus in the absence
of a fixed price.58 Other scholars, however, have placed some or all strategic bargaining costs under the heading of transaction costs. Oliver Williamson would count strategic behavior among transaction costs.59 Guido
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
GOETZ, LAW AND ECONOMICS: CASES AND MATERIALS 35 (1984) (describing a land assembly
problem as “chicken in action”); Lee Anne Fennell, Common Interest Tragedies, 98 NW. U. L. REV.
907, 941–42, 946–47 (2004) (applying the Chicken Game template to anticommons problems).
51 See, e.g., Schlag, supra note 8, at 1675–76.
52 Coase, supra note 1, at 15.
53 Negotiation has no place in competitive markets; market participants instead confront “nonnegotiable equilibrium market prices, prices that cannot be influenced by individual bargaining.” Demsetz, supra note 8, at 12. If there is any negotiation going on, then, it must be under conditions where
there is no competitive price and a real question of how to divide gains from trade. See Cooter, supra
note 41, at 17.
54 But see Demsetz, supra note 8, at 12 (“Close reading of Pigou and Coase does not reveal concerns about strategic misrepresentation.”); Cooter, supra note 41, at 19 (suggesting that Coase viewed
“strategic considerations” as “inconsequential”).
55 See COASE, supra note 44, at 161 (discussing the problem of surplus division and stating that
“there is good reason to suppose that the proportion of cases in which no agreement is reached will be
small”).
56 Coase might doubt that strategic behavior would often preclude a bargain and nonetheless treat as
transaction costs the drag that such behavior imposes on bargaining. However, the costliness of such
strategies depends on the credible threat of “no bargain,” which cuts against this interpretation. See
also Donald H. Regan, The Problem of Social Cost Revisited, 15 J.L. & ECON. 427, 429–30 (1972)
(arguing that to include “bargaining tactics” among transaction costs would call into question the compatibility of individual rationality and zero transaction costs — at least if one believes that rational actors
may
sometimes
bargain
in
ways
that
fail
to
reach
efficient
outcomes).
57 See, e.g., Demsetz, supra note 8, at 11 (“The potential for deceit is not due to positive transaction
cost. If everyone who would benefit from improved climate could transact freely (that is, could be
gathered at no cost, could speak to each other at no cost, could write and enforce contracts at no cost),
the problem of biased demand revelation would still remain.”).
58 Cooter, supra note 41, at 17.
59 WILLIAMSON, supra note 18, at 251–52 (observing, in discussing Coase’s work, that “[i]nstead
of costless bargaining, my negotiations are characterized by information impactedness, opportunism,
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Calabresi includes among transaction costs the “costs of excluding from
the benefits the free loaders, that is, those who would gain from a bargain
but are unwilling to pay to bring it about.”60 The costs associated with
holding out have also been expressly encompassed in some accounts of
transaction costs.61 Other scholarship sends mixed signals about whether
strategic behavior counts as a transaction cost.62
This definitional issue has attracted interest because removing strategic
behavior from the realm of transaction costs presents a challenge to the
Coase Theorem.63 Eliminating transaction costs (defined to exclude such
behavior) would not be enough to ensure an efficient result outside of
competitive market conditions. Or, as Cooter bluntly puts it: “The Coase
Theorem is false because the final obstacle to private noncompetitive bargains is the absence of a rule for dividing the surplus, not the cost of bargaining.”64 Yet the lack of a rule about surplus is not an immutable fact; it
stems from a failure to specify rights over that surplus ex ante.65 If that
lack of specification is itself a product of high transaction costs (the prohibitive cost of obtaining full information and contracting over all contingencies),66 then Cooter’s critique begins to unravel — but so too does our
grip on the preconditions for transactions.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
and the sacrifice of valuable resources as parties seek strategic advantage and thereafter engage in haggling”).
60 Calabresi, supra note 35, at 67. Interestingly, Cooter seems willing to count the costs of excluding “freeloaders” as a transaction cost, despite his insistence that strategic behavior in the absence of
fixed prices represents a wholly distinct phenomenon. See Cooter, supra note 41, at 16 (citing Calabresi, supra note 35). Demsetz, by contrast, views free riding as a serious impediment to efficiency but
does not consider it a transaction cost. DEMSETZ, supra note 7, at 116–17.
61 See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, New Institutions for Old Neighborhoods, 48 DUKE L.J. 75, 103
(1998); Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals’ Costs
to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 273 (1986).
62 For example, Robert Ellickson includes “information costs” in his taxonomy of transaction costs,
see Ellickson, supra note 42, at 615–16, and then indicates in a footnote that “[s]trategic behavior by a
bargainer is designed to generate information about a transferor’s reservation price and terms,” id. at
616 n.25. Earlier in the same article, however, Ellickson makes an offhand reference to “armchair theorizing about whether strategic behavior, or wealth effects, or nonconvexities, or what-not might undermine Coase-Theorem predictions about life in the never-never-world of zero transaction costs” — an
aside that suggests “strategic behavior” could exist even if transaction costs were zero. Id. at 613.
63 See, e.g., Schlag, supra note 8, at 1675–76.
64 Cooter, supra note 41, at 28. Cooter does posit that a version of the Coase Theorem that specifies not only zero transaction costs but also “perfect competition” and “perfect information” holds true.
Id. at 15 (quoting Richard O. Zerbe, The Problem of Social Cost: Fifteen Years Later, in THEORY AND
MEASUREMENT OF ECONOMIC EXTERNALITIES 29, 29 (Steven A.Y. Lin ed., 1976)).
65 This failure to specify surplus division is a general characteristic of private property rights, although it can be characterized as a way in which private property rights are incomplete. See Lee Anne
Fennell, Property and Precaution, J. TORT L., Sept. 2011, art.3, at 60 n.246, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1862403; infra TAN 161.
66 See STEVEN N.S. CHEUNG, WILL CHINA GO ‘CAPITALIST’? 37 (2d ed. 1986) (observing that a
strong assumption of zero transaction costs implies, among other things, that “consumer preferences
would be revealed without cost” and that “workers and other factors of production would be directed
freely to produce in perfect accord with consumer preference”).
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2. Defining and Enforcing Property Rights. — Coase’s framework assumes the existence of property rights.67 Demsetz’s work emphasizes that
property entitlements cost something to define and enforce.68 Should these
costs count as transaction costs? At one level, the construction of enforceable entitlements seems fully anterior to the transactions with which Coase
was concerned. Transactions have entitlements as their subjects, and property law merely provides the vehicles in which tradable commodities arrive
on the scene. There may be problems designing those vehicles — as
where indivisibilities enable free-rider problems — but for Demsetz, at
least, those problems are not transaction costs.69
However, transaction costs have been understood to include the costs
of enforcing agreements. Coase’s initial definition hints in this direction
by including costs “to undertake the inspection needed to make sure that
the terms of the contract are being observed,”70 and he later expressly endorses Dahlman’s placement of “policing and enforcement costs” under the
transaction cost umbrella.71 Property rights might be viewed either as a
means for policing agreements or as a technology that lowers the cost of
doing so.72 At a more fundamental level, the work of defining and enforcing property entitlements is one of many costs that society incurs to create
conditions conducive to enforceable transactions. Oran Young puts it this
way: “[M]ajor transaction costs will not show up in prices or be taken into
account in ordinary efficiency calculations. These include such things as
the costs of defining and securing property rights, enforcing contracts, and
maintaining competition in the face of monopolistic pressures.”73
Of course, many other things are but-for preconditions of transactions,
including the development of language, mathematics, and a monetary system. Calling them all transaction costs seems overbroad. Property rights
arguably stand in a different relationship to transactions than these largescale (and long-sunk) costs because they are legally malleable features of
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
67 See, e.g., Coase, supra note 1, at 8; Demsetz, supra note 40, at S655. Coase’s conception of
property rights has been criticized for being insufficiently “Coasean.” See generally Thomas W. Merrill
& Henry E. Smith, Making Coasean Property More Coasean, 54 J.L. & ECON. S77 (2011). Thomas
Merrill and Henry Smith’s critique focuses on Coase’s assumption that property entitlements can be
disaggregated and combined without limit. Because a Coasean conception of interactions among entitlement holders is sensitive to transaction costs, it suggests the need to create property packages that are
attentive to these costs. See id. at S92–99.
68 See generally Demsetz, supra note 19. As Terry Anderson and P.J. Hill explain, “Establishing
and protecting property rights is very much a productive activity toward which resources can be devoted. But, like any other activity, the amount of this investment will depend upon the marginal benefits
and costs to investors of allocating resources to these endeavors.” Terry L. Anderson & P.J. Hill, The
Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the American West, 18 J.L. & ECON. 163, 165 (1975).
69 See Demsetz, supra note 8, at 11–12.
70 Coase, supra note 1, at 15.
71 COASE, supra note 44, at 6 (internal quotation mark omitted).
72 See Allen, supra note 2, at 898–99 (noting connections between property rights and the transaction costs of “inspection, enforcing, policing and measurement,” id. at 899).
73 ORAN R. YOUNG, RESOURCE REGIMES 129 (1982).
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the world that produce ongoing costs themselves and influence the costliness of transactions going forward.74
Yet reading transaction costs to subsume the whole of property rights is
problematic. For one thing, almost everyone speaks and writes as if transaction costs and property rights are separate things — right down to the
Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, which awarded Coase the 1991
Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel
“for his discovery and clarification of the significance of transaction costs
and property rights for the institutional structure and functioning of the
economy.”75 Linguistic habits aside, viewing property as just another flavor of transaction cost is conceptually incoherent, if we think that there
must be some object of a transaction — a point to which I will return.
Nonetheless, the inclination to include property rights in the analysis
surrounding transaction costs is understandable. Property rights can make
transactions easier in some ways and harder in other ways. Their scope
and complementarity will determine the need for further transactions.76
Moreover, property’s core move — identifying an “owner” as the residual
claimant — avoids the high costs of transacting over every contingency.77
This point connects to bodies of work on incomplete contracting and the
theory of the firm,78 and it brings us to another area of contested definitional terrain.
3. Internal Governance. — Another set of costs relates to property organization, and specifically to the governance burdens found on the inside
of the property envelope. For example, firms may integrate a variety of
functions as a result of high (interfirm) transaction costs.79 Fred
McChesney has taken the view that these internal “management costs”
might be termed a form of transaction costs, while Demsetz has assumed
the opposite.80 Coase himself discussed organizational changes such as
vertical or horizontal integration as alternatives to the high costs of market
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
74 Property rights involve both fixed and variable costs. See Langlois, supra note 14, at 1392–93 &
fig.1 (identifying both fixed transaction costs and transaction costs that are a function of time as
“[c]osts of property rights”).
75 Press Release, Royal Swedish Acad. of Scis., The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences
in
Memory
of
Alfred
Nobel
for
1991
(Oct.
15,
1991),
available
at
www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1991/press.html (emphasis added).
76 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 67.
77 See, e.g., Grossman & Hart, supra note 18, at 692, 695.
78 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
79 See, e.g., Coase, supra note 18, at 390–98.
80 See Fred S. McChesney, Coase, Demsetz, and the Unending Externality Debate, 26 CATO J. 179,
190–91 (2006) (observing that “what Demsetz refers to as ‘management costs’ are just internal transaction costs,” id. at 190, and noting that these costs would be encompassed if transaction costs were “defined as all costs arising from interactions among two or more economic actors,” id. at 191); see also
DEMSETZ, supra note 7, at 107 (“Coase clearly meant to distinguish costs incurred to manage resources within the firm from costs incurred to interact across markets at market-determined prices, and
I wish to preserve this distinction.”).
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transactions.81 But this would not rule out applying the more generic moniker of transaction costs to both classes of costs, and their much-remarked
ability to substitute for each other might argue for placing them under the
same analytic umbrella.82
Adding this last category to the definition of transaction costs makes
the term broad enough to reach the institutional structures in which transactions (or their substitutes) take place, as well as the transactions themselves. Indeed, Steven Cheung has suggested that “[w]ere it not for the
popular usage of the [transaction cost] term, they should perhaps be called
‘institution costs.’”83 The “property right” definition of transaction costs
described by Douglas Allen similarly embraces the costs associated with
establishing and operating property institutions.84 Such a broad definition
of transaction costs avoids some problems of underinclusiveness, but it
does not help to structure the analytic work of designing entitlements or
determining when legal interventions are called for. The problems of overinclusiveness and lack of specification remain. Indeed, the broadest definitions of transaction costs address underinclusiveness by opening the door
to an essentially unbounded class of costs, as the next section explains.
C. Latent Transaction Costs
All of the definitional debates outlined above stem from a single cause:
the uneasy relationship between property rights and transaction costs. The
discussions above hinted that there must be some practical stopping points
in even the broadest definitions of transaction costs, such as not including
all of the costs associated with developing language and a currency system. This intuition seems necessary if we want a tractable category. But a
hard look at the transaction costs concept shows that it is actually quite
difficult to bound in this way; in our efforts to address underinclusiveness,
we end up with an unhelpfully overinclusive category.
The nature of the problem becomes evident if we consider what the
expression “zero transaction costs” means. If the phrase means just that
there are no observable transactions occurring on the ground that generate
any costs, then we would be in a zero transaction cost world anytime bargaining was shut down by some external factor like a governmental prohibition on trades, as well as anytime parties became too discouraged by the
prospects of transacting to even give it a try. This is not the zero transac-

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
81
82

Coase, supra note 1, at 16.
See, e.g., Thráinn Eggertsson, Analyzing Institutional Successes and Failures: A Millennium of
Common Mountain Pastures in Iceland, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 423, 425 (1992) (treating “costs of
exclusion and internal governance” as transaction costs).
83 CHEUNG, supra note 66, at 34.
84 See Allen, supra note 2, at 895–99.

FENNELL - CLEAN BOOKPROOFS CORRECTED

20

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

03/08/13 – 12:57 PM

[Vol. 126:1

tion cost world Coase meant to reference.85 Zero transaction costs must,
therefore, mean not just a literal absence of costs associated with transacting, but rather an ability to costlessly complete transactions.
By the same token, positive transaction costs exist not only when we
actually observe them being incurred (“realized transaction costs”), but also when incurring such costs would be necessary to complete a given
transaction through the market (“latent transaction costs”86) — even
though the entitlement in question is never transferred or is transferred using some nonmarket means. Positive transaction costs are a condition that,
much like gravity, exists in the background even when arrangements exist
to counter or eliminate its immediate effects. Even if a zero-gravity chamber can be created on Earth, every detail of its construction and operation
is a product of the force it is fighting to overcome. Likewise, the costs of
transactions are a latent and shaping presence even in contexts where observable transaction costs, and even transactions themselves, are absent.87
A central way in which latent transaction costs manifest themselves in
absentia is through the formulation of property rights, which avoid the
need for certain kinds of transactions and lower the costs of others, but also carry costs of their own. The implications of this point are interesting
for property scholars. Suppose a particular configuration of property
rights, such as liability rule protection that allows for unilateral transfers of
entitlements, makes transactions unnecessary. This in no way implies we
have reached a zero transaction cost world; rather, it is quite consistent
with a world in which (latent) transaction costs are high, even though the
liability rule regime keeps anyone from having to experience them. The
same might be said about ownership structures that encompass a variety of
disparate enterprises in order to control transaction costs. More generally,
property rule protected entitlements, which substitute a simple in rem regime for private deals with every would-be encroacher, have been cast as
mechanisms for economizing on transaction costs.88
At this point, the reader will detect a troubling unraveling effect.
Coase assumed the existence of property rights, but if property rights are
really just a manifestation of latent transaction costs, why would they (how
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
85 See CHEUNG, supra note 66, at 34 (explaining that “transaction costs” may, on a broad definition, “occur in the total absence of market transactions or even where property rights are not transferable”). But cf. Driesen & Ghosh, supra note 25, at 99 (pairing an assertion that transaction costs can
be “too low” with an example in which parties are discouraged from undertaking any expenditures on
transactions).
86 The term “latent transaction costs” has been used by scholars previously in a variety of ways.
David Driesen and Shubha Ghosh use the term “phantom transaction costs” to refer to unincurred
transaction costs. See Driesen & Ghosh, supra note 25, at 82–84.
87 See CHEUNG, supra note 66, at 34. I am not advancing a principle of conservation here. Transaction costs (and those costs they occasion) can clearly drop in absolute terms, whether through technological or legal innovation.
88 Chang & Smith, supra note 3, at 31 (arguing that “property is a law of things . . . for transaction
cost reasons”).
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could they) even exist in a zero transaction cost world?89 Yet it is hard to
conceptualize what a “transaction” would mean in a world without any
property rights — what would there be to transact over?90 Indeed, imagining the conditions under which no latent transaction costs would be present
requires stripping away not only property rights, but also all forms of government, transportation, communication, education, monetary systems,
firms, households, and so on. The notion of a zero transaction cost world
quickly becomes a metaphysical sinkhole, lending credence to Coase’s
suggestion that “[i]t would not seem worthwhile to spend much time investigating the properties of such a world.”91 So let us step back from the
abyss and make some observations.
Positive transaction costs might be understood to produce three effects
in the real world: (1) the realized costs associated with actual transactions
that we can observe on the ground; (2) prohibitive, unincurred transaction
costs that manifest themselves latently in thing-misallocation; and (3) unincurred transaction costs that manifest themselves latently in other costly
resource access structures, such as property entitlements, legal institutions,
firms, and norms, as well as in behaviors like self-help, stealing, shirking,
and so on. When transaction costs are of the latent variety, we observe not
the cost of the (unconsummated) transaction but rather some other costly
result that, as a first cut, we might assume to be cheaper than that transaction would have been: Demsetz’s efficiently unshipped shipment. Perhaps
the costs of completing the transaction could be cost-effectively reduced
by incurring further costs of the (3) variety, but perhaps the reverse is true
and we should have fewer (3) costs and more (1) and (2) costs. Any observed combination of the three effects may be efficient; the question is
whether there is any way to reduce any of these costs without increasing
the others by an offsetting or larger amount.
The three effects above can unwind the “chicken and egg” nature of
transaction costs and property rights. Imagine that the world starts in a
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
89 One answer is simply that property rights would be unnecessary in a zero transaction cost world.
See id. at 31 n.92; see also CHEUNG, supra note 66, at 37 (“[W]e discover that the assumption of private property rights can be dropped without in the least negating the Coase Theorem! That is . . . in
the absence of transaction costs the allocation of resources would be the same regardless of the nature
of property rights or regardless of the operative economic institution.”); COASE, supra note 44, at 14–
15 (agreeing with Cheung’s statement).
90 See Allen, supra note 2, at 898. Scholars who maintain that “property” refers to a set of entitlements with certain core institutional features might answer that if transaction costs were zero, individuals could transact over bare use privileges and their own labor inputs on a moment-by-moment basis —
all without ever using the institution of “property” as such. See Lee & Smith, supra note 3, at 147–48
(discussing the possibility that “ultra-thin” entitlements might be traded, but for prohibitive transaction
costs). Although this approach would allow for transactions without property (simply by narrowly defining the term property), it would not wholly succeed in stopping the unraveling effect noted in the
text. Even the barest entitlement, and even the idea of an entitlement, is a mechanism for delivering a
stream of benefits in a sensible way where transaction costs are not zero.
91 COASE, supra note 44, at 15.
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state of nature dominated by effect (2), where resources are widely misallocated because transactions are prohibitively expensive. It will be impossible to move from this world to a world of realized transaction costs
without first laying some sort of institutional groundwork to enable transactions. That is, only after we see a certain amount of effect (3) (including
the formation of property rights) does it become possible for effect (1) (the
costs of actual, realized transactions) to be observed. Thus, transaction
cost expenditures of the latent variety can logically precede property rights
even if transactions themselves realistically cannot. Yet because transaction costs also persist even after private property rights and other ways of
structuring access to resources are in place, it is easy to identify them with
the costs of market transactions (effect (1)) and lament their contribution
to thing-misallocation (effect (2)) without revisiting their latent role in the
institutions and practices surrounding resource access (effect (3)).
The awkwardness of thinking in terms of latent transaction costs suggests that the transaction cost category suffers from boundary problems
that run deeper than a list of terminological quibbles. There is a reason
why transaction costs are so hard to define: the movement of entitlements
is entwined with a set of costs relating to property ownership, yet ownership sits uneasily in the transaction cost framework, either relegated to the
sidelines, partly in and partly out of the game, or swallowed up by it in
ways that make its relevance unclear. There is a better way of thinking
about the relationships among property entitlements, transaction costs, and
the efficient allocation of resources.
II. RESOURCE ACCESS COSTS
Let us start over from a somewhat different place by considering the
problem to which legal innovations and interventions must respond. People derive value from the use of resources. The total amount of value
gleaned from the enjoyment and deployment of resources depends on the
specific ways those resources are accessed — how and when and by whom
and in what combinations. Thus, the law must find ways (and has found
ways) to structure access to resources. The challenge is to determine
where resource access improvements can be cost-effectively pursued,
whether through entitlement redesign or otherwise. The first step toward
meeting this challenge is to construct a broad category of resource access
costs that includes all of the costs associated with structuring access to resources.
Before turning to the components of this category, it is worth explaining why introducing a new label, resource access costs, is preferable to
simply redefining the term transaction costs. One reason is simply to
avoid confusion associated with a term that already has multiple, contested
meanings. More importantly, though, constructing the resource access cost
category is a way station toward a shift in approach from transaction cost
minimization to resource access improvements. While it is possible to
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speak in terms of transaction cost improvements, doing so is awkward, especially when some such improvements might involve fewer or more costly transactions. The change in terminology is consistent with a change in
focus. Our problem is not a lack of transactions, but rather a larger set of
impediments to optimal patterns of resource access in a world where resources must be consumed to create and maintain those patterns.
Section A below works through the components of the resource access
cost category, while section B shows how building this broad and inclusive
category causes us to ask different questions than does a focus on transaction costs. Fully answering those questions, however, requires the refinements in Part III that address the remaining problems of overinclusiveness
and insufficiently specified subcategories.
A. Constructing the Category
The resource access costs category includes the costs of resisting transfers, the costs of completing transfers, and the costs associated with resources ending up in the wrong hands.92 Section 1 starts with this third
element, the costs associated with thing-misallocation, which can result either when a resource stays in the hands of a lower-valuing user, or when a
resource moves into the hands of a lower-valuing user. Significantly, shifts
can occur through mechanisms other than markets — whether through giving, lending, sharing, stealing, adverse possession, eminent domain, or internal management decisions. Likewise, resources may be kept from moving not only by formal property rights, but also by norms, force, and so on.
Sections 2 and 3 collectively take on the costs of completing and resisting
transfers. Section 2 focuses on individual efforts to complete and resist
transfers, while section 3 examines institutional arrangements directed at
completing and resisting transfers.
1. Thing-Misallocation. — High-valuing users93 can be separated from
things in two basic ways: through transfers that occur, and through trans–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
92 Getting resources into the hands of the higher valuer is a question of allocative efficiency. Questions of productive efficiency are also in play: we wish to produce transfers and transfer resistance at
the lowest possible cost, but we should produce them only to the extent that they generate sufficient
gains in allocative efficiency. Rather than separate out these types of efficiency and trace their interaction, it is more helpful to apply a Kaldor-Hicks standard to proposed alterations in resource access arrangements to test whether the social losses incurred in making or resisting transfers (or in reducing the
costs of doing so) are outweighed by gains in access to resources by higher valuers. In other words,
could the winners compensate the losers and come out ahead? My use of the term “efficiency” in the
balance of the Article is directed toward this question.
93 A high-valuing user might be understood as one who possesses human inputs that are complementary to the resource in question and that, when combined with it, will maximize the value that can
be derived from that resource. This could be through simple consumption or through the act of combining multiple resources to which one has access; for example, I am the high valuer of the berry if my
input of eating the berry or of mixing it into a pie will cause it to produce greater value than it would
have in some alternative use. Significantly, the institutional structures that provide access to resources
also must be designed to elicit the human inputs that will make that access valuable. See R.H. Coase,
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fers that do not occur.94 Of course, these are the same two ways that highvaluing users get (or keep) access to resources. Table 1 lays out the possibilities.
TABLE 1: KEEPS AND SHIFTS
No Transfer Occurs

Transfer Occurs

Current Possessor Is
the High Valuer

A [Good Keep]

C [Bad Shift]

Current Possessor Is
the Low Valuer

B [Bad Keep]

D [Good Shift]

In the “No Transfer Occurs” column, we have two situations in which
the current possessor remains in possession. In Cell A, this is a good
thing;95 the high valuer keeps the resource. Cell B contains the unhappy
result in which the high valuer does not gain access to the resource. This
may be due to strategic or emotional behavior in the bargaining process on
the part of one or both parties (blocking by the owner or walking away by
the would-be purchaser). Or it could instead be the result of parties’ failure to locate each other and work through the necessary coordinating steps
to complete the transfer. Third parties, including governmental actors,
might also block worthwhile transfers where they control a needed input
(such as liquidity or a necessary permit). These blockades, too, could either be strategic or the product of failed coordination, or they might (as in
the case of some governmental impediments) stem from other normative
commitments.96
The “Transfer Occurs” column contains completed transfers. Cell C
represents transfers that go to a lower valuer, a bad thing. Such transfers
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
The Institutional Structure of Production, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 713, 718 (1992) (“It is obviously desirable that these rights should be assigned to those who can use them most productively and with incentives that lead them to do so . . . .”).
94 Under some property regimes, these problems become interwoven. For example, where resources are held in common, commoners can block each other from using resources, or may misappropriate resources that would be more valuable if left in place. A similar story can be told where
resources are held not in common but in agency relationships: the agent may misappropriate resources
of the principal or block the optimal use of the agent’s own human capital, via shirking.
95 The terms “good” and “bad” in Table 1 are accurate only insofar as all other costs are held constant. As emphasized below, the normative desirability of these keeps and shifts depends not only on
whether they give the high valuer access to the resource in question, but also on how much it costs to
achieve this result.
96 See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1111–15 (1972) (discussing inalienability rules and
their rationales).

FENNELL - C LE AN BOOKPROOFS CORRECTED

2013]

THE PROBLEM OF RESOURCE ACCESS

03/08/13 – 12:57 PM

25

may involve the misappropriation of a resource by a lower valuer or the
foisting of an asset upon a lower valuer through a value-reducing exchange. Alternatively, a Cell C transfer may happen inadvertently, as
when a resource is transferred to a lower valuer as a result of mistake on
the part of one or both parties — a kind of fumble. Cell D reflects shifts
to higher valuers.
It would be tempting, but wrong, to automatically associate Cells A and
D with efficiency, and Cells B and C with inefficiency. Whether the transfers or nontransfers reflected in these cells are efficient or inefficient depends not only on whether they get or keep the resource in the hands of a
high valuer, but also on the resources expended to produce that result. To
put it another way, the resource under discussion in the chart (whether a
chunk of land, a chattel, or a particular use right) is never the only resource in the story. We must also think about the other resources that must
be expended to complete or stop each transfer. Thus, we should think of
Cells A and D as containing goods that we must pay for in some manner.
Likewise, Cells B and C contain bads that we must pay to avoid. Framing
things in this way makes it clear that we as a society can make the mistake
of purchasing too many Cell A retentions and too many Cell D transfers,
and that we can also pay too much to avoid Cell B and C outcomes. The
costs involved may be institutional in nature or may take the form of selfhelp or wrangling of various sorts, as the next section explains.
2. Individual Transfer and Transfer Resistance Measures. — Parties
can engage in a wide variety of defensive and reactive moves in an effort
to stop transfers or to carry them out. For example, an owner can protect
her property by building fences, adding locks, or procuring watchdogs. A
would-be invader can invest in ladders, lockpicks, and meaty bribes, spurring counterinvestments in higher fences, better locks, bribe-proof dogs,
and so on. Similarly, a commoner might respond to another commoner’s
conflicting claim on a resource with violence or harsh looks, or might attempt to forestall such conflicting claims by, say, camping out by the berry
patch with an automatic weapon at hand.
Defensive and reactive moves may produce suboptimal use of the primary resource under consideration, if the resource is destroyed or damaged
in the fray or sits fallow during the dispute. But such moves also involve
the suboptimal use of other resources — time and expenditures devoted to
guarding, fighting, invading, and so on. Costly defenses and reactions may
be undertaken not only by high valuers of the target resource, but also by
low valuers who wish either to fend off thieves or to overcome the fending-off in order to act as thieves themselves. These sources of dissipation
explain why theft is not governed by a liability rule that would enable a
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higher valuer to simply take and pay.97 The thief may be the higher valuer
of the thing in question but, by circumventing the law’s “transaction structure,”98 she triggers wasteful deployments of other resources by the possessor. In Table 1’s classification scheme, a move to a higher-valuing thief
looks like a “good shift,” but it is not normatively desirable (even from an
efficiency perspective) because of the costs involved in bringing it about.99
Another reactive move to an actual or threatened appropriation is a
failure to invest optimally in productive uses of resources. Although there
are complex theoretical and empirical questions about exactly what effect
certain kinds of appropriations may have on investment levels, the potential skewing of human capital away from projects requiring resource inputs
represents another resource misallocation, and one that keeps the possessor
and others from enjoying the would-be products of investment.
The costs of defending and reacting to defenses can also explain why a
commons featuring a fixed quantity of a given resource may generate tragedy, even though it would seem to present a zero-sum game that implicates
only matters of distribution. In fact, there is always a linked resourcegathering commons that may be subject to tragedy, even if the underlying
resource is not.100 Likewise, we can extend our understanding of defensive and reactive dissipation to encompass a wide variety of moves that
may be made within the context of actual and prospective market transactions to gain more surplus from a given transaction. Strategic holdout
problems can emerge where monopoly power is present, and free riding
may crop up when public goods are on offer.101 Even when private and
relatively fungible goods are involved, consumers may still expend effort
attempting to wring surplus from small increments of heterogeneity in
identically priced items, as by picking through the apple bin.102
3. Institutional Arrangements for Completing and Resisting Transfers.
— Although the discussion above abstracted away from institutional detail,
societal arrangements for resource access can make it easier or harder for
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
97 See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen & Richard H. McAdams, The Surprisingly Complex Case Against
Theft, 17 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 367, 371–74 (1997); Fred S. McChesney, Boxed In: Economists and
Benefits from Crime, 13 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 225, 227–28 (1993); Gordon Tullock, The Welfare
Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W. ECON. J. 224, 228–30 (1967).
98 See Alvin K. Klevorick, On the Economic Theory of Crime, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE: NOMOS
XXVII 289, 301–03 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1985).
99 Of course, many thefts are not “good shifts” even in this very limited sense, in that the thieves
are not the higher valuers of the thing in question. More generally, the absence of a market test makes
it impossible to know who is the higher valuer, unless the punishment for theft is calibrated in a way
that effectively elicits this information.
100 See Fennell, supra note 50, at 922–24.
101 See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 49.
102 See YORAM BARZEL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 103 (2d ed. 1997); Yoram
Barzel, Transaction Costs: Are They Just Costs?, 141 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 4,
7–10 (1985). Yoram Barzel observes that the seller is effectively “placing in the public domain his
right over the differential between the more valuable units and the price charged.” Barzel, supra, at 9.
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parties to complete or resist transfers. It is intuitive to think of property as
an institutional arrangement directed at resisting transfers, and markets as
an institutional arrangement directed at completing transfers. But of
course transfers can also occur within the envelope of property ownership;
for example, internal governance can structure the movement of resources.
Indeed, transaction cost analysis has examined in great depth when it is
cheaper to manage resource access outside of markets and within the structure of a firm.103
Analysis similar to that which has been applied to the question of firm
organization can also be applied to more fundamental questions of property rights configuration. How permanent and exclusive should the pathways be that link users and resources? Who gets to sever relationships between resources and their users, or reroute resources to other users, and
under what circumstances? When and how can packages of entitlements
be split up and transferred separately, or aggregated together and moved as
a unit? Considering these questions reveals that the law is involved not
only in structuring access to resources, but also in structuring control over
the institutional features that structure access to resources.104 Here it becomes helpful to speak functionally about the core institutional elements in
play.
Property rights operate to simultaneously grant and deny access to resources by identifying those who will enjoy a privileged relationship to a
given resource.105 Encoded into these entitlements are rules about how
one’s relationship with the entitlement may be altered or maintained over
time. Following the distinction between exclusion and governance,106 we
can distinguish between institutional elements that do the work of providing resource access by walling others out, and those that do their work by
giving individuals access to resources in more fine-grained ways.
Alienable property rights premised on boundary exclusion represent
gated walls that keep the uninvited out while allowing insiders continual
access to the resources within the walls.107 Walls are not the only way to
manage resource access, however. For example, a home’s co-owner might
have a prioritized relationship to a particular part of the house, even if she
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
103 See sources cited supra note 18; see also Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Power in a Theory of the Firm, 113 Q.J. ECON. 387 (1998) (examining how access, in the absence of property rights,
can produce incentives for investment).
104 Cf. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 96, at 1090–93 (observing that a decision must be made
about not only whom to entitle, but also about how to protect the entitlement).
105 See ARNOLD M. FADEN, ECONOMICS OF SPACE AND TIME 215 (1977) (“The entire institution
of private property may be construed as a system of selective barriers, denying access to all except
those authorized by the owner of the property or those having special access rights . . . .”).
106 See generally Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating
Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453 (2002).
107 FADEN, supra note 105, at 215–16 (using the analogy of walls to discuss property); J.E. Penner,
The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 744 (1996) (characterizing property as a “gate” that, unlike a wall, permits “selective exclusion”).
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cannot wall out her co-owners. Likewise, a commoner’s right to draw berries from a common supply under a complex rotation scheme tethers those
resources to her conceptually, even though she does not harbor them within a private walled garden. Property ownership often combines complex
resource tethering within the walls with blunt exclusion of those outside.108
Where multiple activities are being undertaken simultaneously on different
scales, wall placement becomes an interesting and important problem.109
Strong property rights protection is often conceptually paired with markets. It is standard to assume that in a low transaction cost world, property
and markets are all we need. But property rights and markets themselves
help to construct the transaction cost environment in which they will operate,110 and are themselves costly to construct and maintain.111 Further,
some resources resist walling, whether because it is infeasible to subdivide
a given resource system, or because a resource system has external effects
that cannot be brought fully within the scope of any one owner. Markets
may also be ineffective conduits if the parties to a potential transfer fail to
cooperate with each other, whether by strategically holding out for a better
deal or attempting to free ride on transfers to others.
In addition to institutional arrangements for initiating and resisting the
movement of entitlements, we have institutional mechanisms for aggregating and disaggregating sets of entitlements. First, consider aggregation
mechanisms. The economic analysis of law has been faulted for paying
insufficient attention to the design of property rights.112 Getting the right
elements together in one place (in anyone’s hands) is as much a challenge
for efficiency as getting particular entitlements into the right party’s hands.
If property is configured in a way that puts together complementary elements (like access to the land and the right to farm it), then transactions to
put these elements together will be unnecessary; instead, the entire useful
chunk can be transacted over at one time.113 In fact, property law tends to
group together certain entitlements in ways that may be intentionally resistant to unbundling. An antifragmentation rationale has been invoked to
explain a variety of doctrines, including minimum lot sizes and the rule
against perpetuities.114
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
108 See Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission
Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129, 155 (1998) (describing “limited common property” as
“commons on the inside, property on the outside”).
109 See Ellickson, supra note 19, at 1332 (“Decisions on where to set land boundaries are fiendishly
complex because most tracts of land are suited to multiple uses for which scale efficiencies vary.”).
110 See generally, e.g., Dari-Mattiacci, supra note 4.
111 See Demsetz, supra note 19, at 350 (“[P]roperty rights develop to internalize externalities when
the gains of internalization become larger than the cost of internalization.”).
112 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Essay, What Happened to Property in Law and
Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357 (2001).
113 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 67, at S89.
114 See, e.g., Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163, 1173–82
(1999).
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Just as property bundles may be suboptimally thin, they may also be
suboptimally thick, encompassing elements that would be more valuable if
held separately.115 Subdividing entitlements can create new property interests, as where an access easement is carved out of a fee simple estate, or
rights to pollute are parceled out in particular ways. If optimal bundles of
property are contingent on particular social, economic, and technological
conditions, then bundling and unbundling will be necessary as time goes
by, however well-calibrated the initial default bundles may have been.
Another question that property institutions address is when and why
and how parties’ access to resources ends and begins. An access change
might occur voluntarily through gifts, markets, abandonment, or destruction, or through sharing, loaning, delegating, and so on. Parties may also
hold the power to unilaterally sever ties between other people and the resources to which they are attached. Viewed broadly, much of property law
can be understood as specifying who holds the power to end relationships
between people and things, and over whose objections. Closely related is
the question of splitting up the surplus associated with changes in resource
access. If nobody has the unilateral power to divide the surplus definitively, each of two (or more) transacting parties holds an effective veto over
the change in the resource’s ownership, use, or configuration. Sometimes
the law will step in and divide surplus itself, or designate who will be entitled to do so within the context of a given deal. The entire family of liability rules can be understood as specialized mechanisms for dividing surplus.
All of these institutional elements grapple, with varying degrees of
success, with the core problems of unwanted transfers and nontransfers,
and with the defensive and reactive moves that those problems prompt.
And they introduce costs of their own, some of which are publicly borne,
and some of which are privately borne.116 Recognizing that institutional
features introduce as well as control costs is central to a taxonomic approach that captures all that is costly about completing and resisting resource transfers.117
B. A Revised Look at the Costs of Transacting
The analysis above emphasizes that transactions are only one way of
facilitating access to resources, and that transactions themselves require resources that might better be devoted to some other purpose. The sections
below suggest how attending to this point reframes efforts to reduce trans–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
115 See Fennell, supra note 65, at 13–14 (explaining that property rights often comprise blocks of
control that are suboptimally extensive).
116 For example, governments must incur costs to regulate markets and run police departments and
courts, and private parties must incur costs to keep track of, change, or terminate ownership interests.
117 Cf. CALABRESI, supra note 35, at 26–31 (noting relevance of prevention costs and administrative
costs as well as accident costs).
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action costs.118 I retain the transaction cost terminology in this section to
highlight the lens-widening work that the resource access costs approach
brings to inquiries about transaction costs. This analysis prefigures (and
underscores the need for) the subdivisions that I introduce in Part III, below.
1. Transaction Cost Reductions as Products. — Demsetz has usefully
suggested that we view transactions as products like any other.119 It costs
something to produce them, and their production should not be undertaken
unless it generates benefits in excess of those costs. In other words, the
resources that might be used to make a transaction might be better employed making something else, like a widget. For this reason, the mere
existence of high transaction costs does not itself bespeak inefficiency,
much less make out a case for legal intervention. It should, however, push
us to ask two further questions: (1) under what conditions can the market
be expected to undersupply (or oversupply) transactions? and (2) are other
methods of accomplishing the ends of transactions (getting or keeping resources in the hands of a high-valuing user) being underprovided or overprovided relative to the cost savings they produce?
Both questions can be more easily approached by taking Demsetz’s
point one step further and viewing transaction cost reductions as products
that the law can purchase, whether by reducing the cost of inputs, increasing the internalized benefits of transactions, or making the need for the
transaction moot through the use of a substitute. Whether it is worth purchasing those reductions depends on what they cost and what they do for
us in terms of improving resource access.
An initial question is what we mean by transaction cost reductions. We
might mean that individual transactions are subsidized so that their private
cost falls even though their social cost remains unchanged. Or we might
instead mean that individual transactions are streamlined in real terms, as
through a legal rule that removes a procedural requirement, or some form
of standardization that makes transacting easier. Or we might mean that
entire classes of potential transaction costs are sidestepped because transactions are no longer necessary to bring actors together with (or keep them
together with) the resources for which they are the high valuers. Each of
these approaches will have its own sets of costs.
2. Subsidizing. — A naïve response to the reality that transaction costs
can separate high valuers from resources might be to simply subsidize
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
118 My use of the term transaction costs in this section is limited to costs of transacting in the marketplace. Some of the more expansive definitions of the term discussed above would be consistent with
the analysis here, which goes primarily to the problem of underinclusiveness. But the questions that
this analysis pushes us to ask can only be successfully answered through further refinements and subcategorizations that address the problems of overinclusiveness and insufficient specification that are
hinted at here.
119 DEMSETZ, supra note 7, at 109–10.
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transactions. Suppose that after misreading Coase, the government decided to start a “transaction cost counterpunch” initiative in which individuals
could get their transaction costs rebated from a central fund. Citizens
would be invited to turn in records on the time and money spent transacting, in the same way workers turn in receipts to an employer for reimbursement. Even assuming the scheme could be perfectly enforced and all
efforts at fraud deterred, this would not be a good idea. Just as reimbursing for transportation costs would lead people to overuse transportation inputs to the exclusion of cheaper alternatives, reimbursing for transactions
would lead to too many, and too costly, transactions. High valuers might
be united with “things” more frequently as a result, but the subsidized
transactions themselves would pull resources away from higher-valued uses at an even greater rate, generating net losses. Getting rid of private, realized transaction costs would be a recipe for inefficiency, not efficiency.
If an across-the-board transaction subsidy scheme seems suspect, what
about a more tailored approach that subsidizes certain kinds of transactions? We might start by asking whether there is any reason to think that
the transactions in question are being underproduced by the private market.
This might be the case where transactions generate significant positive externalities.120 A subsidy in such a context would be a standard Pigouvian
move. A recent example is found in the idea of “agglomeration bonuses”
offered to owners of adjacent land parcels who agree to retire contiguous
lands.121 In this case, the sweetener for private agreement is added onto
an existing subsidy scheme in recognition of the larger public benefits accruing from contiguous rather than scattered habitat. Put another way, the
system returns some assembly surplus to the parties who are relinquishing
certain rights in their properties. The same problems that support the buyouts in the first place (the inability of the general public to transact easily
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
120 Transactions might also be underproduced if the government is already taxing or otherwise burdening them. In such an instance, the subsidy might address the artificial suppression of demand and
restore matters to the pre-burden baseline. An obvious question is why it would ever be more costeffective to counteract the initial burden than to eliminate it. This might be the case if the burdens on
the transaction came in the form of incentives for appropriate action within the context of the transaction. For example, Nuno Garoupa and Chris Sanchirico point out that certain ways of structuring legal
rules can act as transaction taxes by reducing joint surplus. See Nuno Garoupa & Chris William
Sanchirico, Decoupling as Transactions Tax, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. 469, 469–72 (2010). An invariant
inducement to enter into such a transaction could counter the distortive effects of the incentive scheme
without undoing the scheme itself. But see id. at 486–87 (noting problems with this approach).
121 See Gregory M. Parkhurst et al., Agglomeration Bonus: An Incentive Mechanism to Reunite
Fragmented Habitat for Biodiversity Conservation, 41 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 305, 307 (2002); see also
Todd G. Olson et al., The Habitat Transaction Method: A Proposal for Creating Tradable Credits in
Endangered Species Habitat, in BUILDING ECONOMIC INCENTIVES INTO THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 27, 28–30 (Hank Fischer & Wendy Hudson eds., 1994) (describing and depicting the “habitat
transaction method,” which adjusts the value assigned to a given “habitat patch” based on its degree of
contiguity and configuration); Jonathan Remy Nash, Trading Species: A New Direction for Habitat
Trading Programs, 32 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 20–29 (2007) (discussing and critiquing the habitat
transaction method and variations on it).
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with the landowners) also support a change in the subsidy scheme that better calibrates the benefits accruing to the public.
Another place where the external benefits of transactions might play a
role is in the context of transactions for which a counterparty is not yet
identifiable.122 As I have discussed elsewhere,123 there may be settings in
which the law can play a role in matching temporally offset buyers and
sellers. Suppose some landowners are willing to cede their rights to grow
trees or build additions in ways that would block their neighbors’ solar
panels, but the neighbors with solar panels have not yet arrived (and may
not do so, in the presence of uncertainty about the potential for blockages).
The government could play a role in buying up options on the blocking
rights which could later be conveyed to in-movers. The apparatus to carry
out this operation would be costly, but it would in part be covering costs
that a counterparty would cover were she present to do so.
In cases like these, a transaction that would operate to internalize externalities may be underproduced because not all of the parties benefited
by the transaction can or will contribute to the costs of completing the
transaction. The existence of externalities surrounding transactions does
not provide definitive guidance, however. We must ask a further question,
following Demsetz: whether the transactions necessary to internalize the
externality in question are themselves subject to private underproduction.
Underproduction of such internalizing transactions cannot be inferred from
the mere persistence of an externality, since externalities cost something to
internalize and may not be worth internalizing in a given instance.
This point becomes clear when we recognize that private owners may
choose to leave goods in the commons. Demsetz gives the example of a
parking lot adjacent to a shopping area.124 It would be possible to
propertize the parking spots and charge a fee for their use; indeed, this
happens all the time in urban areas. This approach requires fewer parking
spaces (because people overconsume a zero-priced commodity) and thus
lower costs to create parking lots. But it would also mean higher transaction costs because people have to pay each time they park. As Demsetz
explains, “[W]hile we have reduced the resources committed to constructing parking spaces, we have increased resources devoted to market exchange. We may end up by allocating more resources to the provision and
control of parking than had we allowed free parking because of the resources needed to conduct transactions.”125 In short, creating and enforcing short-term property interests in the individual spaces may not be worth
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
122
123
124

I thank Ariel Porat for discussions on this point.
See Fennell, supra note 65, at 24–27.
Harold Demsetz, The Exchange and Enforcement of Property Rights, 7 J.L. & ECON. 11, 14–15
(1964).
125 Id. at 14.
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it.126 In a case like this one, the inputs into the foregone transactions (an
entry control gate, a gatekeeper, and so on) are readily available through
competitive markets, and the costs of these inputs could be directly imposed on those who would benefit from the arrangement. Transactions are
not being produced in this example because it is not efficient to produce
them. They are not being inefficiently undersupplied. The same point
holds when we move outside the property envelope of a single owner.127
Even if we feel quite certain that a given kind of transaction is being
underproduced, a subsidy may not be helpful. We need to know why it is
being underproduced. A subsidy might work quite well to ease interactions between willing buyers and sellers (paying them for the time it takes
to meet, for instance), but not at all well to address their desire to extract
disproportionate surplus from a deal. As Cooter has noted, reducing certain kinds of transaction costs can actually have a pernicious effect where
strategic holdout behavior is at issue.128 The cheaper it is to transact, the
lower the opportunity cost of wrangling over surplus, and hence the more
of it we are likely to see.
3. Streamlining. — If subsidies seem like an often unhelpful approach
to the problem of high transaction costs, we might turn our attention to
more broad-based measures and expenditures that make market coordination less expensive. Consider government investments in transportation
and communication infrastructure, the public education system, the legal
system, and the currency system. Property rights comprise an especially
interesting and important category of such transaction cost lowering technologies. By creating a tradable commodity — a property entitlement —
the cost of coordinating over a transaction is diminished. Within the broad
category of property rights lie a number of specific “transactability features,” from land registries to standardization protocols to antifragmentation doctrines. All of these things help reduce coordination costs.
In each instance, we would want to make sure that the returns to these
investments are worth the cost — that is, capable of facilitating transactions that will generate more surplus than was expended in the process.
We do have reason to suspect that the private market would undersupply
many of the things that globally reduce transaction costs, to the extent
those things take the form of public goods or goods with large network ef–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
126 Of course, this calculus would have to be rethought if technology, demand, or other factors were
to change in ways that made metering the parking less costly. See Eirik G. Furubotn & Svetozar Pejovich, Property Rights and Economic Theory: A Survey of Recent Literature, 10 J. ECON. LITERATURE
1137, 1145 (1972) (observing that parking meters would reduce the costs of transacting over rights to
individual parking spaces).
127 See, e.g., Jonathan Remy Nash, Economic Efficiency Versus Public Choice: The Case of Property
Rights in Road Traffic Management, 49 B.C. L. REV. 673, 703 n.200 (2008) (noting potential difficulties and costs associated with using “tradable roadway access permits”).
128 See Cooter, supra note 41, at 28 (“In fact, it is cheaper to engage in strategic behavior when
communication is inexpensive.”).
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fects or spillovers. But streamlining costs something, and the fact that the
charges are dispersed across the population should, if anything, make us
more vigilant in comparing what we are getting with what we are giving
up.129
Not all streamlining takes the form of advances in infrastructure or institutions. It might instead involve simply rolling back the formal requirements associated with transactions. Coase mentions one example:
easing the requirements for completing a contract.130 For example, land
transactions would be cheaper to accomplish were it not for the Statute of
Frauds, which requires certain formalities, including the use of a written
document. Likewise, various consumer transactions could be completed
more quickly if merchants did not have to comply with disclosure requirements, offer “cool down” periods, and so on.131
Coase rightly questions whether a given change in the contractual rule
is worth it, when considered across the full run of cases to which it would
apply.132 These formalities add to the costs of transactions, but are also
thought to produce benefits.133 Many of these formalities are meant to
keep consumers from unwittingly engaging in inefficient transactions —
ones that leave them worse off — or to keep fraudsters from accessing resources outside of voluntary channels of trade. Against transaction cost
savings, then, we must weigh the losses from value-reducing trades or
misappropriations as well as associated forms of defensive, reactive, and
institutional dissipation. Put another way, we cannot analyze the effects on
the costs of transfers without considering the effects on transfer resistance
costs.
4. Sidestepping. — Neither streamlining nor subsidies get rid of market transactions; they simply make market mechanisms less expensive for
willing participants to use. Such approaches are not designed to deal with
strategic behavior that can impede bargains. A great deal of legal attention
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
129 An insight of public choice theory is that scattered impacts may elicit a muted political response
relative to those concentrated on a small, cohesive group. See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P.
FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 12–37 (1991) (discussing the role of interest groups in the political process). As Benito Arruñada has observed in the context of registries, to avoid inefficiency,
“[R]eformers have to be attentive to signals indicating whether demand really exists for a new institutional development.” BENITO ARRUÑADA, INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF IMPERSONAL EXCHANGE 7 (2012).
130 COASE, supra note 44, at 25–26.
131 Merchants may themselves intentionally increase the transaction costs that some or all of their
potential customers face, whether to screen out some customers, price discriminate among customers,
or for other reasons. See generally David Gilo & Ariel Porat, The Hidden Roles of Boilerplate and
Standard-Form Contracts: Strategic Imposition of Transaction Costs, Segmentation of Consumers, and
Anticompetitive Effects, 104 MICH. L. REV. 983 (2006).
132 See COASE, supra note 44, at 25–26.
133 See id.; see also Driesen & Ghosh, supra note 25, at 87 (“Transaction costs slow down the process of transacting and provide a means for parties and the market system to sort out the good transactions from the bad.”).
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has focused on ways to bypass transactions altogether, primarily through
liability rules. Liability rules permit transfers to occur on the unilateral
initiative of one party upon payment of a stipulated amount to another party.134 These “substitutes for transactions”135 avoid struggles over surplus
by setting a price. But, like every other approach to structuring resource
access, liability rules have costs of their own.
One set of concerns has been strongly associated with liability rules in
the existing literature: the possibility that they will undercompensate, and
the associated risk that they will transfer resources to low valuers and
thereby discourage ex ante investments. These possibilities represent costly resource misallocations. But there are other costs associated with liability rules, ones that apply even when they achieve their goal of moving resources to a higher valuer. In addition to the cost of setting up and
running the liability rule regime, defensive and reactive dissipation may
occur as parties attempt to protect their property against unilateral, undercompensated appropriation (or, alternatively, attract overcompensated appropriation) through rent-seeking or otherwise.
Liability rules are not the only substitutes for transactions. In addition
to outright theft, there are a variety of legally approved transfers without
compensation, such as adverse possession, prescription, and regulations
that fall short of compensable takings. Here too we see how avoiding
transactions introduces other costs (defensive and reactive moves following
invasion or the threat of invasion).136 To the risk of value-reducing transfers (bad shifts) we must add costs that apply regardless of whether the
transfer goes to a lower- or higher-valuing user. An especially interesting
set of such costs is political in nature and relates to literatures on transition
relief,137 as well as to Frank Michelman’s notion of “demoralization
costs.”138
All of these costs become implicated in entitlement design choices.
For example, property regimes that grant owners a robust veto power
across a wide range of dimensions allow owners to choose from an expansive slate of possible activities without having to transact with anyone
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
134
135

See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 96, at 1092, 1105–06.
Calabresi, supra note 35, at 69. Liability rules do not produce true transactions because they do
not involve the voluntary participation of two or more parties, but instead allow one party to override
the veto power of the other.
136 These costs include defensive moves that are the product of errors, or that represent overreactions. See, e.g., Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154, 156–57 (Wis. 1997) (homeowners
refused to allow parties delivering a mobile home to cross their land to avoid dangerous conditions on
an alternate route, based on an earlier experience of losing land to adverse
possession).
137 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509, 517–
19 (1986); Jonathan S. Masur & Jonathan Remy Nash, The Institutional Dynamics of Transition Relief,
85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 391 (2010).
138 Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of
“Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1214–18 (1967).
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first.139 But that same breadth of choice, which constrains the options left
open to others, may lead to more conflicts than would a more restricted set
of ownership vetoes. In the absence of any incentive or mechanism for
owners to head off future trouble,140 the ensuing clashes may well require
coercive governmental intervention. Against the claimed benefits of such
large and blocky sets of rights, then, we must balance the potentially greater need for coercive interventions to address the problems that such rights
create. And we must also add the political fallout from that coercion, as
well as any costs that are incurred to reduce that fallout to acceptable levels.
There are at least two other ways to sidestep transactions. One is for
the law to simply assign resources to their high valuers, through court
judgments or otherwise.141 The other is to create organizational structures
that eliminate the need for transactions with outsiders. Both of these possibilities have been extensively addressed in the existing transaction cost
literature. I will make just two points here to connect these possibilities to
the resource access costs perspective.
First, property law plays an often unsung role in assigning resources to
parties who are likely to be high valuers. One way it does so is by creating durable sets of rights that extend forward indefinitely in time and run
against all outsiders. Were it not for these features, a possessor could
maintain possession moment to moment only by constantly paying everyone else to stay away or by engaging in more costly transaction substitutes,
like violence or guarding. We can thus see embedded in the durable structure of property a rebuttable presumption that possession today is complementary to possession tomorrow, and that if the current possessor is the
high valuer today, she is most likely to be the high valuer tomorrow, and
tomorrow, and tomorrow.142 Following this Article’s analysis, however,
the durability of property rights should not be taken as a given simply because it eliminates the need for certain kinds of transactions; its overall
impact on systems for providing access to resources must be assessed.

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
139
140

See generally Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719 (2004).
I have elsewhere offered a proposal along these lines, whereby owners could receive payments
for alienating options on certain aspects of their property holdings, thus effectively downgrading certain
aspects of their bundles to liability rule protection. See Fennell, supra note 65, at 22–52.
141 This point connects to the one above about political costs, to the extent that the assignment disrupts expectations about entitlements.
142 This presumption relates to property’s trait of “persistence.” See Henry E. Smith, Property as the
Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691, 1711–12 (2012). There are instances where the opposite presumption of non-persistence applies (think of vacation campsites, public restroom stalls, or seats on a
thrill ride). In these cases, it is assumed that value is maximized by rotating possession rather than
leaving it perpetually with one person — but these are thinner slices of possession than many people
would identify with property rights.

FENNELL - C LE AN BOOKPROOFS CORRECTED

2013]

03/08/13 – 12:57 PM

THE PROBLEM OF RESOURCE ACCESS

37

Durability reduces societal flexibility, and it does so in a way that may not
be appropriately priced.143
The second point is that choices about organizational structure or, analogously, the size and scope of property holdings, may not incorporate full
social costs and benefits. This is because there is a discontinuity in responsibility that occurs at the property line, with governance inside largely
falling on private parties and governance outside largely falling on public
entities. Parties can sidestep transactions by expanding their holdings, but
doing so means giving up some in-kind subsidies, especially with respect
to transfer resistance. The result may be unwitting legal encouragement of
particular organizational forms or spatial configurations, at least in the absence of countermeasures. This point has received much less attention
from legal scholars than has the potential for the fragmentation of entitlements to impede later reaggregation.144
III. TOWARD RESOURCE ACCESS IMPROVEMENTS
The umbrella category of “resource access costs” offers a starting point
for a new analytic approach. It addresses the problem of underinclusiveness associated with transaction costs by taking into account all of
the costs of transferring resources and of keeping them where they are, as
well as the losses that are sustained when either set of costs becomes too
large to bear. It also provides a new perspective on where transaction
costs, and transaction cost reductions, fit into the overall mission of improving access to resources.
Constructing this category is only a first step, however. On its own,
the category is too all-encompassing to helpfully inform entitlement design
or decisions about legal interventions. For the same reason, it is not sufficient to simply expand the definition of transaction costs to encompass
every element that grants, withholds, or regulates access to resources.
Recognizing that all ways of structuring access to resources implicate costs
is necessary to avoid an unduly narrow focus, but applying a costminimization function to all of civil society is not a tractable task.145 Legal scholars interested in entitlement design enter the property story in medias res, confronted with institutional structures designed to solve resource
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
143 See, e.g., T. Nicolaus Tideman, Integrating Land-Value Taxation with the Internalization of Spatial Externalities, 66 LAND ECON. 341, 347 (1990) (observing that landowners withdraw flexibility
from a social fund, and proposing a tax on the right to remain as a possible solution).
144 See, e.g., Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from
Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998).
145 This analysis highlights a baseline issue that lurks in transaction cost analysis. The Coasean
baseline is, implicitly, a “perfect” resource allocation in which all things are held by their highest valuers. Transaction costs disrupt this pristine world. Broadening our focus to all resource access costs
does not on its own alter this baseline, though it does make clearer its artificiality: we now must conceptualize a baseline world in which no property or other institutional elements exist, but in which all
resources are nonetheless held by their highest valuers.
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access problems and a stack of unresolved impediments to optimal resource allocation.146 It is necessary to identify with precision the resource
access improvements that particular changes or interventions can buy us,
and trace the costs of these moves, including their impacts on alreadyaddressed collective action problems.
This Part makes a start on that project. Doing so requires addressing
two remaining problems in constructing a useful set of concepts for addressing resource access problems: overinclusiveness and insufficiently
specified subcategories. Section A focuses on the second problem by
drawing a distinction crucial to entitlement design: the degree to which the
resource access costs in question stem from efforts to wrest something (including surplus) from another party, rather than efforts to coordinate with
another party in the transfer or nontransfer of an entitlement.147 Section B
addresses overinclusiveness by differentiating costs that are the product of
market forces and broad-based societal institutions from those that are the
product of unsolved collective action problems. This distinction helps isolate resource access costs that are relevant to overall efficiency — the only
resource access costs for which targeted legal interventions may be appropriate.148
A. Conflict and Coordination Costs
As the earlier discussion emphasized, the owner (or current possessor)
of a resource may or may not be the high valuer. When a nonowner
comes along, the two parties may or may not agree with each other on
whether a transfer should occur, or they may agree on the fact of the transfer but disagree on the price. In competitive markets where prices are
nonnegotiable, it is entirely possible for both parties to be in full agreement on transacting at a given price; their only problem lies in coordinat–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
146 The point at which entitlement designers enter the story depends on prevailing social and legal
conditions. In some instances, broad-based measures to solve large societal problems must precede the
sort of fine-grained tinkering that might be contemplated in relatively affluent societies with welldeveloped property rights, education systems, and so on. I thank Deborah Weiss for comments on this
point. Scholars have explored related points. See, e.g., ARRUÑADA, supra note 129, at 118–22 (discussing, in the context of registries, how reforms interact with existing legal orders and how they might
be sequenced); Langlois, supra note 14, at 1400–05 (examining how institutional and technological
change over time alters the mix of transaction costs and the prospects for addressing them).
147 The distinction between conflict and coordination can be seen in game-theoretic formulations.
See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, Beyond the Prisoners’ Dilemma: Coordination, Game Theory, and
Law, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 209, 230–35 (2009) (emphasizing the significance of coordination games in
modeling legal problems); see also Robert Ahdieh, Beyond Individualism in Law and Economics, 91
B.U. L. REV. 43, 62–65 (2011) (observing how conflict enters into coordination games).
148 The idea that resource access costs may be either relevant or irrelevant to efficiency follows from
the distinction drawn between Pareto-relevant and -irrelevant externalities in James M. Buchanan &
Wm. Craig Stubblebine, Externality, 29 ECONOMICA (n.s.) 371, 373–81 (1962). See also Dahlman,
supra note 28, at 145, 150, 152–53 (discussing the idea that transaction costs do not generate Paretorelevant externalities); section III.B.2, infra TAN 169–178 (examining how the relevance of resource
access costs to efficiency might be assessed).
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ing the transaction. In many other cases, the absence of established prices
means that parties who both desire a transfer (or nontransfer) may nonetheless disagree about how the surplus from that event should be divided.
Thus, sometimes interactions over resources involve only coordination,
sometimes they involve only conflict, and in most cases of interest to legal
scholars they involve both. Entitlement design must, therefore, grapple
with both types of resource access costs. Carol Rose made just this point
in distinguishing Type I and Type II transaction costs, where the former
represent what I here call coordination costs, and the latter represent conflict costs.149 I extend her typology to include not only the costs involved
in moving entitlements, but also the costs of keeping them in place. Figure 1 lays out the possibilities.
FIGURE 1: CONFLICT AND COORDINATION
Nonowner

Wants
Transfer

A
Owner

B

Wants
Nontransfer

C

Wants
Transfer

D

E

F

Wants
Nontransfer
Legend

coordination

conflict

pre-assigned
surplus

The lettered lines in Figure 1 represent six possible combinations of interactions between nonowners and owners over resources. Line A represents
the desired (by both parties) transfer of a good at a competitive market
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
149 See Rose, supra note 14, at 2184–88; see also Langlois, supra note 14, at 1390 (drawing a parallel distinction between “transaction costs as frictions” and the problems that arise from opportunism).
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price. This price preassigns surplus to the consumer, as indicated by the
black circle, and therefore involves no haggling, only coordination. Line
B obtains when there is no competitively determined market price but both
parties desire a transfer. The situation mixes together conflict and coordination — coordination over the fact of the transfer, but conflict over the
division of the surplus. Line C involves an owner who wishes to force a
transfer upon an unwilling nonowner, while Line D involves a nonowner
who wishes to force a transfer to herself from an unwilling owner; both
situations involve conflict.
Sometimes owners and nonowners agree that no transfer should take
place. Line E presents the common situation in which neither party desires
a transfer and both parties converge on the convention that this nonevent
should happen in a way that leaves all surplus with the owner. Here, they
need only coordinate. For example, most people who park their cars in a
parking lot or put their coats in a cloakroom hope to leave with (and only
with) the item they already own. Line F represents the situation in which
both parties desire a nontransfer but conflict over how to divide the surplus
from this nonevent. Nonowners’ attempts to extract surplus for a nontransfer (by, say, taking a person or chattel hostage and demanding a ransom)
tend to be criminally punished, and hence situations of the Line F type are
highly unusual. Where they occur, however, both conflict (over surplus
division) and coordination (over how to accomplish the nontransfer) may
be involved.150
Much of the confusion surrounding transaction costs goes to whether
the term refers just to the costs of using markets to facilitate trade between
willing buyers and sellers at set prices — that is, the coordination costs incurred by parties whose interactions track Line A. As Figure 1 suggests,
this is only one possible type of interaction, and it does not describe many
of the contexts that are most interesting to legal scholars.
In contexts where set prices are not found and the parties must decide
on their own how to divide the surplus (Line B in Figure 1), both conflict
and coordination costs are usually strongly implicated. For example, if I
want to buy a car from you,151 we must find each other, decide when and
where to meet, incur the costs of getting there, and bear the costs of the
necessary paperwork to complete the transaction (I must write a check,
you must sign over the title). These are all coordination costs. Before the
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
150 Note that this situation is quite different from one in which a party already owns a particular right
(such as to make noise, locate a stable, or exclude a crane from the airspace) and attempts to obtain a
large amount of surplus from its transfer; this scenario fits easily into situation B in Figure 1. See generally Larissa Katz, Spite and Extortion: A Jurisprudential Principle of Abuse of Property Right, YALE
L.J.
(forthcoming
2013),
available
at
http://ssrn.com
/abstract=1417955; Kelly, supra note 48.
151 Cooter also uses a car-buying example to distinguish what he terms “transaction costs” from strategic behavior. See Cooter, supra note 41, at 17.
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transfer can take place, I must also gather quite a bit of information about
the car and the price you are willing to accept. Otherwise, I cannot be certain that the trade is advantageous to me. Likewise, in order to be sure
that the trade will be advantageous to you, you must gather information
from me about the price I am willing to pay.
This information gathering still involves coordination between us because of our common interest in completing a worthwhile deal, but the
specter of conflict is beginning to loom. The deal, if it is worth doing, will
produce at least some surplus. That fact raises the question of how the
surplus will be divided, and here our interests conflict.152 We may strategically misrepresent our reservation prices in an effort to gain more of the
available surplus. If your car is unique and my desire for it is unquenchable, and if I am the only buyer within range and your need for cash is
pressing, we may find ourselves locked in a bilateral monopoly situation.
We incur conflict costs as we wrangle over how low or high each of us
will go.
There are other conflict costs in this story as well. I will worry that
you are misrepresenting some of the attributes of the car in an effort either
to gain more of the surplus or to generate a transfer in your own favor under circumstances that will leave me worse off. Whether or not you are
actually engaging in misrepresentations or covering over the car’s defects,
I will likely incur defensive costs in trying to verify its attributes, as by
running a Carfax check on it, or taking it to a mechanic of my own before
buying it. You may react to my defensive moves by expending greater resources to fool me (and Carfax, and my mechanic). Conversely, you will
worry that when I take the car for a test drive I will simply make off with
it. You will incur defensive costs in trying to determine if I am a good
type before handing over the keys. You might require me to show you my
driver’s license and perhaps hand over the keys to my own car as a “hostage.” If I am in fact bent on making off with the car, I might incur costs
to thwart your defensive moves, causing you to be even more cautious.
A close look at how conflict can infect the transaction process reveals
that even some of the costs that were earlier identified as “coordination
costs” occur in the shadow of conflict and are shaped by the potential for
conflict.153 For example, we may incur extra costs (in waiting or transportation) to meet in broad daylight in a public place rather than in the nearest
dark alleyway at night — and these costs would be unnecessary if we fully
trusted each other. Similarly, you might demand a cashier’s check from
me rather than a personal check if you are not sure I am good for the purchase price, causing me to make an extra trip to the bank. More funda–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
152
153

See id.
To put the point a little differently, conflict costs must be controlled in certain ways before the
prospect of cooperation even becomes possible. Thus, the property rights literature emphasizes the role
of secure rights in facilitating trade.
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mentally, the signing over of title is necessary only in a world where disputes might arise over who is to be granted access to the resource.
A similar blending of coordination costs and conflict costs can be
found in many other situations. Consider the familiar polluting factory
that creates misery for nearby residents far in excess of the value that the
factory creates. When high transaction costs are cited as a reason why an
inefficient outcome could persist, legal scholars mean more than just that it
is logistically difficult for the residents to communicate with each other
and coordinate a buyout, although they do mean that. The transaction cannot occur without resolving conflicts that arise among the residents over
who should contribute and in what amounts (free-rider problems) and conflicts between the factory and the residents as a whole over the division of
surplus.
Despite the fact that conflict costs and coordination costs are often
blended, it is useful to distinguish them conceptually. In some settings, either conflict or coordination costs dominate while the other category of
costs is absent or trivial. Notably, conflict costs do not produce much difficulty when a transaction is conducted in a competitive market backed by
strong protections against force and fraud. Haggling is entirely absent because the surplus division is fixed in advance; the price is set at marginal
cost. Transactions are costly (at the margin) in this context only if the cost
of coordinating is high relative to the available surplus. Very often this is
the case. For example, I buy fewer pairs of shoes than I would if transacting over them were costless. The shoe market is highly competitive, and I
have no fear of shoe fraudsters. It is just a hassle to bother with shopping
for them. I am not acting inefficiently when I forgo a purchase that I
would have made were it costless.154 This is Demsetz’s point.
In other contexts, conflict costs dominate and coordination costs are
trivial. For example, suppose I plan to build a high privacy fence and my
next-door neighbor would rather I did not. Assume the law is clear on my
right to build, but my neighbor will lose more than I will gain if I go
through with it. In theory, he could pay me some amount not to build. We
would have no trouble finding each other, communicating with each other,
or traveling to transact with each other; we already live next door, and no
third parties (let us assume) are affected. If we cannot come to terms, it is
because one or both of us wants more surplus (pecuniary or nonpecuniary)
from the transaction than the other is willing to cede.
Conflict costs and coordination costs also come into play in various
mixtures where resource access is structured without the use of market
transactions. Conflict costs, including defensive and reactive behavior, are
incurred whenever parties resort to force or fraud to allocate resources to
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
154 Here, I set aside the (likely) possibility that my failure to do more shoe shopping inflicts harm on
others.
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themselves outside of approved channels. Similarly, conflict costs are incurred when parties shirk or overappropriate in a commons, or react to
such actions in kind or through other defensive or reactive moves. Organizational structures that give a single owner authority over a range of uses
and decisions may avoid the need for transactions, but will typically also
produce conflict costs when agents try for larger shares of surplus and
principals respond to those attempts. Coordination costs will be incurred
in many of these nonmarket settings as well. Even the most faithful agent
must be directed, and this takes time and effort. Likewise, even commoners who have no thought of taking advantage of each other must spend
time and energy devising a workable system for sharing access to resources.
Finally, coordination costs dominate in most cases when both parties
desire a nontransfer, as shown in Line E. This is a ubiquitous state of affairs. Most people, most of the time, have no desire to take resources from
each other by encroaching on property rights. Yet, as Henry Smith and
Thomas Merrill argue, steering clear of property violations (inadvertent
transfers) requires that both owners and nonowners use information.155
The way in which property rights are configured and protected will affect
the content and legibility of that information, and hence will impact the
costs of coordination that the parties incur in avoiding unwanted transfers.156
Property design choices can be used to influence both conflict and coordination costs. However, features that have a salutary effect on some
subset of these costs may have either no impact or a countervailing impact
on other costs. The question that entitlement designers must confront is
whether a given feature saves more in net conflict or coordination costs,
and in the associated improvements in resource access, than it costs. Table
2 presents again the situations we saw in Figure 1, along with the design
features that would be conducive to overcoming the conflict and coordination costs they present.

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
155 See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The
Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 26 (2000).
156 Merrill and Smith make this point when discussing the role of the numerus clausus in controlling
information costs. See id. at 26–28; see also Peter J. Menell and Michael S. Meurer, Notice Failure
and Notice Externalities, 5 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS (forthcoming 2013), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1973171 (discussing the need for effective notice in both tangible and intangible property contexts to enable parties to avoid infringing others’ rights).
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TABLE 2: CONFLICT, COORDINATION,
AND DESIGN FEATURES
Line
from
Fig. 1

Owner
Wants
Transfer?

Nonowner
Wants Transfer?

Role for
Surplus
Division?

Conflict or Coordination?

Design
Features

A

Yes

Yes

No

Coordination

Transactability

B

Yes

Yes

Yes

Both

SurplusDividing

C

Yes

No

N/A

Conflict

Veto Power

D

No

Yes

N/A

Conflict

Veto Power

E

No

No

No

Coordination

Legibility

F

No

No

Yes

Both

Veto Power

Much of the disagreement about entitlement design comes down to a
debate between those who focus on Line A, where transactability features
are key, and those who focus on Line B, where surplus-dividing features
play a primary role.157 Each group claims to be talking about reducing
transaction costs, but they are talking about different things — different
facets of the overall enterprise of minimizing resource access costs. While
scholars concerned with coordination costs have emphasized the importance of transactability features, scholars concerned with conflict costs
have emphasized mechanisms (notably liability rules) that control struggles
over surplus. Recognizing that these two very different strategies address
different sets of problems is an important prerequisite to examining the
tradeoffs involved in designing property rights.158
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
157 It is true that the coordination element in Line B could also make transactability features relevant,
but there are two complications that make this proposition uncertain. First, surplus-dividing features
often take the form of transaction substitutes, like liability rules, that render some or all of the transactability features moot. Second, easier transactability may actually exacerbate the problems associated
with strategic behavior. See Cooter, supra note 41, at 28. Thus, it is not clear that a well-defined and
highly transactable property package will actually produce more efficient results than a more cumbersome one, where the real impediment is strategic behavior.
158 See Rose, supra note 14, at 2184–88.
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As Table 2 illustrates and as this Article emphasizes, we must be concerned not only with market transactions but also with other sorts of transfers and with efforts to keep transfers from occurring. The counterpart of
transactablity for parties who are both trying not to engage in a transfer is
rendered here as legibility. Thus, clearly marked boundary lines and clear
systems of titling would help owners and nonowners to coordinate in ways
that avoid unwanted (by both parties) transfers from the former to the latter. The ability of an owner to resist a transfer to a nonowner who desires
one, and the ability of a nonowner to resist a transfer from an owner who
wants one, can both be addressed by giving parties veto rights. These veto
rights, in turn, contribute to the strategic interactions in Line B when both
parties desire a transaction but disagree on the surplus division.
Some standard features of property entitlements, such as well-defined
exclusionary edges, can advance more than one goal at once. Transactability features may double as aids to legibility by making it easier for other
parties to steer clear. The genius of property lies in precisely this doublesided accomplishment: stopping resource movement while at the same
time facilitating it. State-enforced exclusion rights not only facilitate coordination over nontransfers, but they also address conflicts that take the
form of misappropriation. However, not all of the familiar characteristics
of property entitlements reduce all of the costs in Table 2. Significantly,
transactability features are not designed to, and generally do not, ease
fights over surplus. They might even make things worse.159 By the same
token, some legal interventions are designed to address conflict costs (liability rules, which cut through fights over surplus, are a good example) but
do not reduce coordination costs and might increase them.160
This analysis shows that private property arrangements solve certain
kinds of resource access problems very well. Transactability and legibility
facilitate voluntary transfers and nontransfers, respectively, where coordination is the relevant obstacle. Private property rights also handle certain
kinds of conflict well, by giving owners and nonowners alike a veto over
transfers that are not mutually desired. But these property entitlements
embed another source of conflict by leaving unassigned the division of
surplus upon transfer. This embedded incompleteness follows from the
choice to make the owner the residual claimant, a position granted to the
party whose inputs are the hardest to measure and who must be indirectly
incentivized to invest optimally.161 Here, the incentive takes the form of
property rule protection, which grants the owner the right to collect the returns that the property generates unless and until she gets a price she likes.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
159
160
161

See Cooter, supra note 41, at 28.
See Rose, supra note 14, at 2187–88.
See Smith, supra note 139, at 1795–97; see also BARZEL, supra note 102, at 78–80 (discussing
property holders as residual claimants).
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The relevance of investment incentives flows in turn from the owner’s
right to control other inputs, including her own human capital. Property
offers a mechanism for inducing individuals to shift these inputs to socially
valuable uses. In a world of zero transaction costs, appropriate contracts
could be written to provide for all imaginable contingencies. There would
be no need to grant anyone a residual claim over anything because rewards
for desired investments could be set using the information that would be
costlessly available in such a world.162 Property rights would disappear,
along with the problem of dividing surplus. Here we see again how property can be understood as both a response to and a cause of positive transaction costs.
It is significant that some institutional responses, both past and potential, have the power to alter the mix of situations falling within each of the
six alternatives outlined above. For example, prior to the development of
any property rights or any rule of law, we would expect to see more conflict over whether a transfer would occur, and perhaps even more attempts
to extract surplus from allowing possession to continue. Property rights
and the development of markets make possible Line A, where coordination
becomes the central preoccupation, but also contribute to the development
of Line B, where surplus division presents conflict. It is not impossible to
imagine further institutional developments that would help to pre-divide
surplus in cases that now present conflict.
For example, suppose a group of 100 people currently find themselves
locked in a free-rider dilemma that keeps them from being able to buy out
a polluter whose benefits from continuing in operation are less than their
collective costs. They face problems of coordination, but also problems of
conflict: each person hopes to gain additional surplus from the buyout by
not contributing to it. Yet the conflict may be driven in very significant
part by the fear of being taken advantage of by others (that is, being
“suckered”) rather than by a desire to take advantage of others. If everyone in the group would be happy to contribute if others paid their fair
share, a mechanism might be designed to enforce equal contributions in a
manner that would help to turn the conflict problem into one of coordination.
Setting up such a mechanism is not costless. But all property arrangements involve costs. We must examine what various design features buy
us (in, say, transactability and the unblocking of human capital) and what
we have to give up (in the potential blocking of resources that follows
from leaving surplus from future transfers unassigned). Matching design
features to resource access impediments offers a clearer way of making
these sorts of tradeoffs.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
162

See CHEUNG, supra note 66, at 37.
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B. Resource Access Costs and Collective Action Problems
Another way of subdividing the umbrella category of resource access
costs is to distinguish costs that represent unsolved collective action problems from those that do not. This distinction addresses the overinclusiveness built into the concept of transaction costs by asking whether costs
hide untapped surplus that the law can unlock. Legal scholars (including
myself) often reflexively equate thing-misallocation with uncaptured surplus. After all, the resource could be used more efficiently by someone
else. But there is no surplus available to be captured if fixing the misallocation will cost more than it is worth. Such surplus exists only if the impediments to the thing’s efficient allocation embed inefficiencies themselves — ones that the law is in a good position to (further) address. This
will not always be the case.
Legal scholars have skipped over this point for two reasons. First,
there is a tendency to focus on the costs of thing-misallocation and to ignore the costs that are saved by leaving those misallocations alone. Second, there is really no doubt that transaction cost reductions (and reductions in other transfer and transfer avoidance costs) would be
underproduced by markets and private actors working alone, so that at
least some legal interventions are plainly warranted. Yet we should not
lose sight of the fact that transaction cost reductions are products like any
other, ones that can become too expensive for society to
purchase.
1. Identifying Unsolved Dilemmas. — Inputs into transfers or transfer
resistance may be underproduced by the market if the parties who would
benefit cannot coordinate among themselves. Institutional responses, including property itself, address such collective action problems.163 The
question for legal scholars is whether there are any unaddressed collective
action problems that artificially elevate the cost of, or the need for, these
inputs. Consider the following factors: the length of time it takes a human
being to read a paragraph of text, the cost (in time and gasoline and automobile wear and tear) to travel to a meeting, the cost of printing out a contract, the ease with which a phone call can be made, the cost to repair a
nose broken in a trespass dispute, the expense of fencing in livestock.164
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
163 A rich literature addresses how property rights emerge, develop, and change over time. See generally, e.g., GARY D. LIBECAP, CONTRACTING FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS 4–28 (1989); Demsetz, supra
note 19; Saul Levmore, Two Stories About the Evolution of Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S421
(2002); James E. Krier, Essay, Evolutionary Theory and the Origin of Property Rights, 95 CORNELL L.
REV. 139 (2009). A central puzzle is how parties faced with a tragedy of the commons can solve the
second-order collective action problem of coordinating to create property rights to address this tragedy.
See, e.g., James E. Krier, The Tragedy of the Commons, Part Two, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 325
(1992); Carol M. Rose, Evolution of Property Rights, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 93, 94–95 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
164 See, e.g., Anderson & Hill, supra note 68, at 172 (noting that the development of barbed wire in
the 1870s “greatly reduced the cost of activities aimed at enclosing one’s land”).
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In important ways, these quotidian costs are no different in kind from the
costs of producing other goods and services, or of carrying out other activities. By and large, they are produced by ordinary market processes and
background physiological, social, and economic conditions.
This is not to say that these costs are immutable or that law has no
bearing on them. Certainly, there are many things that law and social policy can do at a high level of generality to influence such costs. Governmental bodies provide transportation infrastructure and public education,
and they determine city layouts and speed limits.165 The law broadly supports private innovation, which can lead to such transaction-relevant innovations as better mobile phones, faster laser printers, improved surgical
techniques, or better fencing. Competition policy and general laws that
govern the manufacture and sale of products further contribute to the
background conditions that produce these costs.
Yet these legal and policy influences primarily represent existing solutions to collective action problems that operate at a broad level of generality. Those solutions may be quite imperfect, and it is entirely fitting that
legal (and other) scholars should revisit them. But because of the level of
generality at which these solutions operate, further alterations would at
least presumptively apply broadly as well, rather than be uniquely targeted
at completing or resisting transfers.
For example, the law would be concerned about distortions in the paper
market caused by paper mill pollution regardless of whether the paper in
question is used to write a contract, make a paper airplane, or draft a novel. Likewise, innovation policy broadly supports mobile phone advances,
whether a phone is used to call a sick friend or to close a major deal. Public education is valued not only because it lets people transact more easily,
but also because it makes people better voters and citizens, and prepares
them to work in a wide variety of jobs — including jobs producing goods
and services other than transactions. There is no reason to expect a transfer-specific legal intervention to improve matters, absent some additional,
unsolved collective action problem that uniquely plagues transfers or transfer resistance.
Yet even if the inherent costliness of factors like phone calls or fencing
is determined by a combination of market forces and broad-based features
of the legal and social context, their prevalence in ordering resource access
can be directly affected by transaction-specific legal rules and entitlement
design features. For example, the law’s requirements for titling and bills
of sale might shorten or lengthen the time the parties must meet or alter
the amount of text that has to be read or written to finish a trade.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
165 For a discussion of the economics of infrastructure provision and maintenance, see generally
Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons Management, 89 MINN. L.
REV. 917 (2005).
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Even more significantly, legal rules and assignment protocols influence
the need to engage in transactions in the first place, which determines
whether these categories of costs will be incurred at all. Thus, in rem
rights avoid many separate transactions with nonowners (saving countless
pieces of paper, phone calls, and so on). Other features, like standardized
property forms or property registries, may reduce the need to gather information.166 Analogous points might be made about transfer resistance.
Some design features, such as strong exclusion rights, stand in for self-help
and may, for instance, allow owners to get by with clear property markers
rather than unscalable walls. Similarly, certain organizational forms that
the law might encourage or discourage can reduce the total amount of
transfer resistance necessary within a particular realm.167
In all these instances and many more, we should be on the lookout for
some kind of collective action problem that stands unsolved and that law
would be in a position to address (or to address better, if the existing law
produces suboptimal results). A variety of such problems may exist. Parties may have difficulty coordinating if property rights are ill-defined or
insufficiently standardized.168 Collective action problems in the political
process may produce suboptimal transfer requirements — as well as
suboptimal transfers. Outdated entitlement menus may stick in place because there is no market incentive for anyone to take the lead in altering
them. Perhaps most significantly, parties may have trouble reaching
agreement due to holdout or free-rider problems.
2. Assessing Inputs. — Asking whether particular resource access costs
stem (in whole or in part) from unsolved collective action problems is a
proxy for a deeper set of questions about the relevance of those costs to
efficiency. I use the word “relevance” here to consciously invoke the concept of irrelevant externalities introduced in an important article by James
Buchanan and William Stubblebine.169 Externalities are irrelevant to efficiency if internalizing them would not change behavior, but rather would
only alter distribution. For example, a polluting factory may reap benefits

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
166 See, e.g., ARRUÑADA, supra note 129, at 43–75 (discussing the role of titling and registration
systems in facilitating transactions); Douglas Baird & Thomas Jackson, Information, Uncertainty, and
the Transfer of Property, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 299, 309 (1984) (comparing “possession systems” and
“filing systems” for property from an information perspective).
167 The point here is similar to the geometric one often made about fencing. Bringing holdings under common ownership expands the domain in which transfer resistance is unnecessary, but not without
increasing internal management burdens. See Ellickson, supra note 19, at 1332–33.
168 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 155, at 27.
169 Buchanan & Stubblebine, supra note 148, at 380–81 (distinguishing Pareto-relevant externalities
from externalities generated in situations in which “[t]he internal benefits from carrying out the activity,
net of costs, may be greater than the external damage that is imposed on other parties,” id. at 381); see
also, e.g., David D. Haddock, Irrelevant Externality Angst, 19 J. INTERDISC. ECON. 3 (2007).
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that are so great that it would continue to emit at the same level even if it
had to cover the costs it imposed on its neighbors.170
We can draw a similar distinction among resource access costs based
on their relevance or irrelevance to the production of efficient overall outcomes.171 Recognizing this distinction requires examining the inputs into
completing or stopping resource transfers. Costs associated with inputs
that are available through well-functioning, competitive markets — for example, the paper on which contracts are written, the phone calls with
which meetings are arranged, or the fences that keep out the uninvited —
are presumptively irrelevant to efficiency in the sense they will not stand
in the way of an efficient overall allocation of resources.172 Some inputs,
however, are not available through competitive markets. These inputs include a variety of legal or institutional arrangements that can be understood as past attempts to solve collective action problems, the efficiency of
which can be independently assessed. Another important and ubiquitous
class of inputs into transfer and transfer resistance that is not provided
through competitive markets is the consent of the relevant rightholders to
changing or maintaining existing resource access arrangements. Coercion,
on which the state holds a monopoly, represents a potential substitute for
the consent of the parties involved.173
To take the simplest example, a sale requires the consent of both buyer
and seller, each of whom holds certain rights (the seller to hold onto her
property, the buyer to hold onto his money). That each rightholder has a
monopoly on her own consent to the transfer creates no difficulty where
markets are competitive; the consent of some other rightholder will form a
ready substitute. Difficulties can arise, however, where the consent of two
or more specified rightholders is essential in order for a resource to be
transferred or kept in place.174 In such cases, we would want to know
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
170 See JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 49 (7th ed. 2010) (giving a similar example to illustrate that not all externalities produce inefficiencies).
171 Dahlman likewise examines the relationship between Pareto-relevant and -irrelevant externalities
and transaction costs, although he does not ultimately distinguish categories of transaction costs along
these lines. See Dahlman, supra note 28. Instead, his analysis seems to set up a choice between circularity (in which transaction costs are built into the constraints pursuant to which optimization takes
place, so that the world is always deemed to be optimal) and unbounded normativity (in which “externality” becomes a placeholder for a political view that the government can do the job better than the
market). See id. at 152–56. Dahlman appears to conclude that we can avoid the horns of this dilemma
by attempting to reduce transaction costs wherever possible. See id. at 161–62.
172 This is not to suggest that these costs have no impact on resource allocation. They may well
stand in the way of efficient thing-allocation. But they do so efficiently, insofar as it is cheaper to conserve the resources associated with changing the thing’s allocation than it is to reap the benefits of doing so.
173 This coercion could be exercised in a specific setting, as with eminent domain, or it could be
built into institutional arrangements that allow, for example, a majority to alter zoning rules.
174 In a two-party case, there may be a problem of bilateral monopoly. A multiparty case might be
styled as an anticommons problem, though it could also arise from circumstances traditionally under-
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whether the input in question (consent to the resource access change) is
being underproduced as a result of Pareto-relevant, uninternalized externalities — that is, whether the fact that parties do not bear all the costs of
withholding consent has constricted the supply of that input. If so, the
next question is whether the government is well positioned to costeffectively address that constriction of supply, through coercion or otherwise. The answers to these questions may be difficult to discover in a given case, but as suggested above, we can begin with an easier one: whether
a collective action problem is present in the story.175
The fact that an unsolved collective action problem is in the picture
does not always argue for legal intervention. Perhaps the problem cannot
be cost-effectively solved through law or (to put it another way) cannot be
solved without producing larger negative impacts on other things that are
connected to the problem at hand.176 In particular, we must be mindful of
how attempts to solve remaining collective action problems can undermine
existing arrangements that address other collective action problems.177
Nonetheless, the existence of a collective action problem does help to
identify situations in which the government may have a comparative advantage over the market in facilitating resource access improvements.
By contrast, if all the costs in the picture are the product of wellfunctioning markets, then it is unlikely that targeted legal interventions are
warranted.178 This will be the case in many categories of market exchange
where there is no feasible prospect of altering allocation protocols so as to
obviate the need for the transactions altogether, and no obvious way in
which entitlement design interacts with the costs of transacting. Shoe
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
stood as commons problems. See Fennell, supra note 50, at 934–37; Demsetz, supra note 19, at 354–
55.
175 The collective action problem in question could be a commons or anticommons dilemma surrounding the transfer or retention of specific resources, or it could be a collective action problem that
impedes innovation in entitlement design or institutions that would solve a recurring set of problems, as
by making certain transactions unnecessary or providing a protocol for surplus division.
176 See COASE, supra note 44, at 25–26 (recognizing this point in the context of contract formalities); Schlag, supra note 8, at 1688–89 (discussing the role of indivisibilities in addressing transaction
costs).
177 This is the essential lesson contained in Rose’s examination of Type I and Type II transaction
costs. Rose, supra note 14, at 2184–88. She critiques Ayres and Talley for not appreciating the way in
which addressing Type II costs can run up Type I costs by partly dismantling a property system that
goes a great distance to control (what I here call) coordination costs. See id.
178 Inputs into transfer or transfer resistance that appear efficiency-irrelevant from a static perspective may be efficiency-relevant when examined from a dynamic perspective or at a higher level of generality. Consider a variation on the factory hypothetical above in which neighbors who are bothered by
the factory’s fumes would collectively gain more than the factory would lose if it stopped emitting, but
cannot coordinate with each other due to language barriers. If the market for translators is competitive,
the prohibitively high cost of transacting would appear efficiency-irrelevant because it does not impede
the optimal allocation of resources (counting those that would go toward translation). However, from a
longer-range perspective and considered at a higher level of generality, changes in education that would
enable more people in the area to share the same language might be a cost-effective improvement.
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shopping is again a good example. There is no feasible way to simply assign me the shoes that I value most highly, and all of the impediments in
the picture (the distance I must travel to and from the store, the time it
takes to identify and try on likely shoes, and the queuing and other efforts
required to complete the purchase) are ones that targeted legal interventions can do relatively little to influence. Because none of these inputs into would-be transactions represent unsolved collective action problems that
can be cost-effectively addressed through law, the resulting thingmisallocation is efficient.
Legal scholars’ conventional focus on transaction costs has in some
ways been too narrow, but this analysis shows that it has also been in another way too broad. Some costs that fall under the heading of transaction
costs do not make out a good case for legal intervention or even sustained
scholarly attention. Yet we presently lack a good vocabulary for distinguishing the shoe case from instances in which costs of transacting are
highly amenable to reduction through legal innovation. The absence of an
unsolved collective action problem offers a useful basis for ruling out resource access costs that are unlikely to impede overall efficiency.
IV. OBJECTIONS AND EXTENSIONS
There are several objections that might be raised to the approach taken
here. Answering these objections suggests some ways in which the analysis might be extended.
A. Didn’t We Know All This Already?
The discussion above has been abstract and conceptual, and it is fair to
ask how, or if, adopting a resource access costs approach would change the
way legal scholars think and write about resource problems. More to the
point, does the analysis here tell us anything we did not already know? I
do not claim to have discovered entirely new ground; many of the points
raised here can be found in one form or another in scattered places
throughout the literature. But the current way of framing the problem of
resource access runs counter to identifying useful solutions. Only by
changing the way we approach the problem can the existing knowledge be
brought together in a way that legal scholars can use.
The approach here adds analytic clarity in a manner analogous to other
significant theoretical advances. Quite simply, it is possible to do an inefficiently good job of getting entitlements (“things”) to higher valuing users, or of keeping them there. The idea of an inefficiently high level of
law enforcement has been well accepted since Gary Becker’s work on
crime and punishment.179 Similarly, Calabresi made the possibility of an
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
179 Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 170
(1968) (observing that the question of optimal enforcement can be “[p]ut equivalently, although more
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inefficiently low level of accidents part of the standard operating equipment for the economic analysis of tort law.180 There should be a similar
level of familiarity with the possibility of too many efficient thingtransfers, where too many resources are drawn into the resource-structuring
process. Subsuming transaction costs into a broader inquiry into optimality in resource access helps to make this point intuitive.
A resource access approach also emphasizes a basic parity among costs
that is undermined by designating some subset of costs as “transaction
costs” worthy of special attention. The costs of moving resources to new
owners are no more and no less problematic than the costs of keeping
them in place when they should not be moved, or of altering them in ways
that make them less useful. Consider the metaphor of an ice block that
melts in transit, which economists often use to illustrate transportation or
transaction costs.181 Suppose we can reduce melt by loading the ice block
into a speedy transport vehicle or slotting it into well-engineered chutes —
that is, through intelligent entitlement design and market facilitation. We
have made the resource easier to move, but we may not have improved resource access. For example, if we must chop resource units into blocks of
standard size to ready them for transit, we may end up with resource transfers that look artificially cheap (in melt) if we forget to notice what they
cost up front (in chop). We might have been better off with less chop and
more melt. We might have been better off forgoing both chop and melt, if
the surplus associated with the resource’s rearrangement is outstripped by
the costs of such rearrangement.
This metaphor relates to a number of current debates in property, including the relative merits of property rules and liability rules, and the degree to which property should come in standardized packages. We should
be willing to accept less useful property rights in order to make them easier to handle — but only if we gain more than we lose. Appreciating this
point turns transaction cost savings from a trump card into a conversation
starter.

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
strangely, [as] how many offenses should be permitted and how many offenders should go unpunished?”).
180 See generally CALABRESI, supra note 35.
181 See, e.g., Langlois, supra note 14, at 1390 (citing Paul A. Samuelson, The Transfer Problem and
Transport Costs, II: Analysis of Effects of Trade Impediments, 64 ECON. J. 264 (1954)) (discussing Paul
Samuelson’s “famous iceberg model of transportation costs” in which “a certain amount of the iceberg
melts away as it is transported — or, we might add, as it waits around while being exchanged”). The
caveat about the resource “waiting” to be exchanged can be extended: a resource capable of throwing
off a stream of value greater than that which its present possessor can capture has some of its value
melt away if it is not transferred. Guarding and other efforts to preserve the resource represent additional sources of melt.
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B. Isn’t This Too Drastic a Departure?
A converse objection might be that the approach here breaks with existing approaches too sharply to be realistically adopted at this stage in the
development of law and economics. Here, two clarifications are important. The first is that this Article’s analysis is not in fundamental disagreement with Coase’s approach. On the contrary, it represents an extension of that approach. Coase wrote against the view that the presence of
an externality means something has gone wrong in a way law can and
should fix. Indeed, if transaction costs are zero, Coase correctly observed,
we can safely draw the opposite conclusion. Coase never made the converse claim that high transaction costs always evince inefficiency that the
law can and should address. Just as we must look behind externalities to
see if there are impediments to bargaining over them, we must also look
behind those impediments to see what they are made of and what is causing them, and whether their magnitude or incidence can be cost-effectively
reduced. Some externalities should remain uninternalized (internalizing
them would cost too much) and some transaction costs should remain prohibitively high (lowering them would cost too much). Coase’s analysis is
fully consistent with this observation.
Because of the nature of his inquiry, Coase emphasized the potential
for high transaction costs to keep resources from reaching their highestvaluing users (rather than the potential for transaction cost reducing institutional elements to have the same effect). He undertook a partial equilibrium analysis in which many features (including property rights) were taken
as given.182 This approach was well suited to his project, but it is not an
approach that is well suited to the work of legal academics whose job it is
to pull apart and examine the very variables that interact with the costs of
transacting in the market. To say that doing this or that will lower transaction costs is neither here nor there without an analysis of what else happens to resource access as a result.
My second clarification returns to the question of terminology. It may
seem rather late in the game to tell people to abandon a term, “transaction
costs,” that is so central to the economic analysis of law. In fact, I am not
recommending that the phrase be eliminated from the scholarly vocabulary
altogether. It is a perfectly useful stand-in for a whole set of obstacles that
contribute to thing-misallocation. The problem arises when this descriptive term is imported into normative analysis without recognizing its limitations. Once attention turns to questions about what law should do, it becomes necessary to use terms that can identify ways to improve resource
access. The transaction cost term cannot do this effectively on its own be–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
182 See Oliver E. Williamson, Hierarchies, Markets, and Power in the Economy: An Economic Perspective, 4 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 21, 24 (1995) (describing the Coase Theorem as “a partial rather
than general equilibrium construction”).
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cause it is beset by problems of underinclusiveness, overinclusiveness, and
insufficiently specified subcategories. We can improve the quality and
precision of the discourse by having terms at hand that help us frame the
problem of entitlement design appropriately, sift relevant costs from irrelevant ones, and distinguish coordination costs from conflict costs.
C. Why Maximize Value?
The analysis in this Article tries to improve how we think and talk
about the efficiency of resource access. We would do better to speak more
precisely about how property arrangements impede or facilitate access to
resources by high valuers. But it is also possible to read this Article as a
first step toward a more radical rethinking of resource access questions.
By making clear that the real issue is not who gets to own which entitlements, but rather who gets access to which resources, the Article invites a
deeper questioning of the efficiency inquiry’s reliance on willingness to
pay.
The focus on transaction costs has led to a way of thinking about efficiency that uses market transactions as the elusive ideal; it suggests that
other ways of accomplishing transfers merely stand in for those transactions when they become too costly. The goal is to mimic the outcomes we
would get if transactions were not so expensive to produce — outcomes
that would be determined by willingness to pay. Once we stop thinking
about transactions as the prototype and instead examine how to optimally
arrange access to resources, the question arises of why value (interpreted
in terms of willingness to pay) should be the right metric.
The question is a larger one than I can take up here. But it is interesting that simply moving one step away from a focus on transaction costs
highlights the distributively conservative character of that focus. Indeed,
the use of money as a marker can be viewed as yet another bit of fallout
from our positive transaction cost world — a stopgap measure that fills in
as best it can, and at some positive social cost, for transactions based on
utility alone.183
To put the point a different way, we might follow Pierre Schlag’s lead
and consider an alternative to the Coase Theorem that starts with the counterfactual assumption of perfect, costless governmental allocations.184 If
governmental allocations were costless, it would be possible to directly
pursue social welfare maximization rather than rely on market allocations.185 If we then introduced governmental costs into such a world —
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
183 The evolution of money has indeed been understood as a response to transaction costs. See
Coase, supra note 93, at 716–17.
184 See Schlag, supra note 8, at 1693–97.
185 Cheung makes a similar point, observing that “[i]f all transaction costs, broadly defined, were
truly zero, . . . consumer preferences would be revealed without cost” — a state of affairs that would
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information costs, political costs, and so on — we might find that using
markets ended up being a reasonable second-best solution for allocating
many resources. But we would count it as a cost of the system, and not a
benefit, that its method of aggregating information through the price system directed resources to high valuers rather than to those who would derive the greatest welfare improvements from the resource.186
D. Why Stop at Access?
I have centered my attention on resource access. This focus might
seem to replicate in some ways the problems I identify in this Article. Just
as transactions are only one way (and an imperfect and costly way) to
structure access to resources, so too is resource access merely instrumental
to the ultimate aim of resource use. Is something of consequence to legal
scholars lost by focusing on resource access rather than resource use?
This question, too, deserves more attention than I can give it here, but a
few points are worth emphasizing. We can start with the empirical connection between optimizing access to resources and optimizing resource
use. There are two facets to this connection: the degree to which access is
a necessary precondition to optimal resource use, and the degree to which
access is sufficient to induce optimal resource use.
Access is sometimes necessary to optimal resource use in a visceral
and clear-cut way. If a given berry is best used as nutrition for Jed, it will
be impossible for it to be deployed in that way without getting the berry
into Jed’s stomach, which requires giving Jed access to the berry. In other
cases, access is a practical necessity because the costs of arranging optimal
resource use in its absence are too high. Lloyd Cohen gives the example
of a department-store developer who would not need to worry about a
holdout retaining ownership (or, presumably, physical possession) of a
corner of the planned store’s footprint if it were feasible to contract over
this resource’s optimal use — here, as a seamlessly attached segment of
the store.187 These two examples together suggest that access by highvaluing end users is essential to optimal resource use, but access by parties
involved in producing value for end users is only instrumental to that goal.
Whether to grant producers of value something less than physical access to
inputs or something more (such as formal property rights) is thus an open
and contingent question.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
permit optimality to be achieved from any sort of institutional arrangement. CHEUNG, supra note 66,
at 37–38.
186 Schlag makes a related point when he observes that focusing on a costless market transaction “is
really an invitation to look at certain forms of information . . . [that] a market produces such as prices,
payments, outputs, etc.” and “to disregard other types of information — notably the kind that the government obtains such as votes, protests, expertise, etc.” Schlag, supra note 8, at 1695.
187 Cohen, supra note 50, at 351–53.
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Further, it is clear that access will not always be sufficient to ensure
optimal resource use, whether in production or consumption. The step
from resource access to resource use requires the essential ingredients of
human effort and choice. By and large, the law can only structure access
to resources and set up incentive systems; it cannot directly compel uses.188 The law can grant Jed access to a berry patch, but he must decide to
pick the berries; it can grant him a bowl of berries, or a voucher for berries, but he must take additional steps to wring nutrition out of this arrangement.189 Even when the government “itself” engages in a use, like
using land for a highway, it is really only structuring access to the land, the
paving equipment, and so on, and giving its human agents incentives to
use these resources in a particular way. It is not without justification, then,
for law to focus on access, the tractable margin, rather than on inputs that
it cannot directly control.
Nonetheless, the gap between access and use is an interesting one for
law, and it should not be neglected in examining how entitlement structures and other incentive systems operate. This Article has pursued an instrumental view of transactions that casts them as part of a larger set of resource access structures that includes, but is not limited to, private property
rights. Access, in turn, may be viewed instrumentally as well. As
Raghuram Rajan and Luigi Zingales have shown, access can be used to
elicit optimal investments in the absence of property rights, and sometimes
this arrangement can dominate the residual rights associated with ownership.190 Here, access to production factors creates incentives that, ultimately, improve access to consumption items by end users. But end users
too may require encouragement to use resources optimally.
Informal or nonpecuniary methods of persuasion or coercion may become important in translating access into use. For example, rather than
regulate access to water directly, the law might try to convince people that
using too much water is shameful. This would be an indirect method of
trying to secure access to water for other users, or later versions of the
same users. Likewise, access to healthy foods or opportunities for exercise
may be accompanied by exhortations to make use of these resources.
Viewing access instrumentally thus opens up new lines of inquiry. For example, some resource access structures might require more norms-creation
work than others to achieve the ultimate end of optimizing use. If so, we
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
188 To be sure, the law frequently rewards and penalizes use and nonuse, and thereby influences how
resources are used and not merely how they are accessed. But these legal approaches really come
down to a set of rules about how people gain and lose access to resources (whether the resources that
they are being encouraged to use or not use, or other resources that the state presents as incentives).
The government can also strongly encourage certain kinds of uses by removing alternatives.
189 See Noah D. Zatz, Poverty Unmodified? Critical Reflections on the Deserving/Undeserving Distinction, 59 UCLA L. REV. 550, 573–74 (2012) (discussing what it means for a resource like bread to
be “available”).
190 See Rajan & Zingales, supra note 103.
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might explore how these norms, and their supporting structures, produce
costs or benefits for society.191
CONCLUSION
Regardless of exactly how the term is understood, “transaction costs”
does a poor job of focusing legal scholars’ attention in all, and only, the
right places. If transaction costs are worthy of special attention from legal
scholars, it must be because they relate in some important way to legal
processes, structures, entitlements, or institutions — dials that the law can
twist. But if that is our criterion for paying special attention — legal remediability or tractability — then our attention must extend not just to the
cost of transactions (however defined), but also to the costs of doing things
through law that make transactions less costly or less necessary. Rather
than taking center stage on their own, then, transaction costs are one of
several cost factors implicated by resource access arrangements, and transactions are only one of several ways of structuring resource access. At the
same time, there is no reason to focus attention on costs that cannot be
cost-effectively reduced through the law’s dial-twisting, or to twist dials
that are disconnected from the real problems at hand.
To address the problems of underinclusion, overinclusion, and insufficient specification that have plagued the use of the transaction cost category, it is first necessary to widen our lens to take in all the costs of structuring access to resources. The next step is to usefully subdivide this set of
costs to home in on places where targeted legal interventions can improve
resource access. Emphasizing the distinction between conflict and coordination costs better frames the tradeoffs in entitlement design. Likewise,
the distinction between costs that are and are not produced by collective
action problems helps to focus attention on the improvements for which
property design has a comparative advantage.
Instead of reading Coase’s analysis as a directive to “use the law to lubricate private bargaining,”192 property scholars should be concerned with
improving access to resources — including those resources that must be
used to structure access to other resources. With the approach presented
here, I hope to have made a start toward that goal.

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
191 Cf. Gregg P. Macey, Coasean Blind Spots: Charting the Incomplete Institutionalism, 98 GEO. L.J.
863 (2010) (critiquing the “incomplete institutionalism” of law and economics and urging greater attention to the internal responses of firms to transaction costs).
192 Cooter, supra note 41, at 14.

